Keep the Blazers. Renovate Moda. Make a deal, not a donation.
Updated November 1, 2026 · 69 answers with sources & video
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Record checked November 1, 2026: negotiating authority is not a signed final renovation deal.
Approval to sign is not proof that an agreement has been executed. A project-status webpage can also lag later action. We do not infer that no agreements have been signed or that every dollar is unspent from the absence of a published closing package.
Require a dated public register distinguishing authorizations, signed commitments, debt issuance, and actual expenditures, including advisory costs. The public should not have to reconstruct those milestones from press statements.
August 12 resolution and framework · October 21 ordinance and impact statement · DAS condition tracker · Our deal tracker
The August 2026 framework describes approximately $573 million in proposed public renovation funding:
| Government | Proposed renovation contribution |
|---|---|
| State of Oregon | $365 million |
| City of Portland | $120 million |
| Multnomah County | $88 million |
| Total | $573 million |
The framework also contemplates up to $275 million in continuing City contributions and up to $13.6 million in additional County support, subject to specified conditions.
Together, those proposed renovation amounts and continuing ceilings total up to $861.6 million before financing costs.
The $861.6 million is a nominal framework figure. It is not the present value of the obligations, a guarantee that every ceiling will be reached, or a binding final price.
The County's August resolution describes up to $101.6 million in total County participation, comprising the renovation and initial ongoing capital framework.
The final all-in cost is not established. Borrowing adds repayment costs beyond the dollars spent on construction.
In March 2026, OPB reported state budget analysts’ estimates of $530 million to $625 million in total repayment to provide $365 million for renovation. That implies $165 million to $260 million beyond the net renovation proceeds.
If every continuing-support ceiling in the August framework were reached, the arithmetic would be:
This is a conditional nominal-dollar illustration, not a present-value estimate or a forecast that every ceiling will be spent. The state repayment estimates predate the final financing terms. Principal must not be counted twice.
Our earlier $1.15 billion headline did not supply the local borrowing assumptions needed to reproduce that total. We have removed it. Council should require a year-by-year schedule of expected payments, interest, fees, receipts, and downside exposure for every government before approving the final package.
Source: OPB, March 4, 2026 financing estimates · Framework amounts and conditions
December matters, but a financing schedule is not the same as a statutory deadline that permanently ends all funding options.
DAS says the required conditions must be completed by the end of December 2026 for its planned spring 2027 bond sale and summer construction start. Council’s August resolution also directs definitive documents back by December 31.
SB 1501 sets financing conditions; it does not impose a December lease-signing deadline. SB 5701 organizes the $200 million and $165 million net-proceeds authorizations into the 2025–27 and 2027–29 biennia, respectively.
Missing the schedule could delay construction, increase costs, and require different financing arrangements or legislative action. Neither future funding nor a specific length of delay is guaranteed.
The demand is straightforward: disclose the actual costs and legal consequences of delay, alongside the cost of accepting weak terms. A consequential deadline is not a reason to sign an incomplete bargain.
DAS financing timeline · SB 1501, §§3–6 · SB 5701, §§4–7 · Council Resolution 37750
Historical video context: the dated clips below are preserved; the written answer above reflects the current record and qualifications.
Earlier timeline records: OPB, June 9 financing schedule · Correspondence and timeline · Our dates tracker · SB 1501
A credible relocation alternative requires more than a city with wealthy residents and basketball fans.
It requires an available arena or financed replacement, a viable ownership and operating arrangement, acceptable economics, NBA approval, and a willingness to bear relocation costs.
Seattle and Las Vegas are especially important because the NBA formally began exploring expansion into both markets in March 2026.
Commissioner Adam Silver has described both as priority expansion markets and publicly said that failing to retain the Blazers in Portland would be a failure for the league.
That creates meaningful obstacles to an assumption that Dundon could simply move into one of those markets.
But expansion has not been guaranteed. The NBA could approve zero, one, or two teams, and future circumstances could change.
Relocation is possible. An immediately available, economically superior relocation opportunity has not been publicly established.
Sources: NBA expansion announcement · Silver's September comments
Seattle’s loss of the Sonics is a warning about ownership incentives and enforcement, not proof that a larger subsidy always saves a team or that a determined owner inevitably leaves. Portland should preserve its existing remedies and price the real alternatives.
Portland’s existing contractual protections
Historical video context: the dated clips below are preserved; the written answer above reflects the current record and qualifications.
Silver discusses the franchise's history, Portland's importance to the league, and the NBA's relationship with Nike: the opposite of “the league does not care.”
Source clip: NBA Commissioner Adam Silver with Brooke Olzendam, Portland Trail Blazers, March 13, 2026.Seattle history: Seattle Times reporting on the owners’ emails · ESPN reporting on the lease settlement
The Arena Operating Lease runs through October 11, 2030, with a possible five-year extension.
The associated Exclusive Site Agreement also creates direct franchise obligations and remedies concerning relocation.
These are meaningful contractual protections.
However, a contract is not the same as a physical guarantee that a franchise can never move. Its duration, exceptions, enforcement provisions, transfer rights, and remedies must be examined carefully.
An owner might breach an agreement and litigate, seek consent, negotiate an exit, or pursue relocation at a later date.
That is why the existing protections should be independently valued and any new agreement should strengthen rather than inadvertently surrender them.
Source: City's arena ownership and lease summary
The Exclusive Site Agreement §1.3 requires City consent to relocating or seeking to relocate home games during its term; §4.2 provides for specific performance or injunctive relief. Those rights give the City negotiating leverage, subject to the complete agreement. Some risk remains.
Arena Operating Lease · Exclusive Site Agreement, §§1.3 and 4.2
They are included in the City-approved negotiating framework.
The August term sheet proposes approximately $3.17 million in initial annual rent, with escalation provisions, and an initial $3 million annual payment in lieu of property taxes, with its own escalation terms.
Those are meaningful proposed returns and should be acknowledged.
But their actual financial value depends on commencement dates, duration, credits, recipients, enforceability, and whether they survive defaults or changes in ownership.
A payment shared among the City, County, and schools is not equivalent to the entire payment being available to the City's General Fund.
And a proposed payment is not yet an accepted contractual obligation.
The final financial model should show every public receipt by year and by recipient.
Source: Councilor Avalos's explanation of the August amendments
At a minimum, the final agreement should make the following matters clear:
These are not abstract demands. They determine whether the public has enforceable rights when circumstances change.
Private management expertise does not establish that every proposed cost is necessary or every public dollar protected. Require justified procurement, supportable affiliate fees, independent cost certification, and adequate completion support. Efficiency is a reason to demand accountability, not abandon it.
Our proposed fair-deal requirements · Our comparable-deal analysis
The public should receive enough information to evaluate the complete transaction.
That includes:
Reasonable protections for genuinely confidential commercial information can coexist with meaningful public transparency.
The public should not be asked to commit large sums to an agreement it cannot evaluate.
Include any proposed release of existing claims, its independently assessed value, and an explanation of every material departure from Council’s requirements. Our Register proposes meaningful public review periods; those are standards to adopt, not deadlines already imposed by law.
It may require no increase in existing tax rates. That is not the same as having no public cost.
Oregon currently collects income taxes from players, employees, performers, and businesses associated with Rose Quarter activity.
Under SB 1501, specified income-tax revenues would be redirected to the Oregon Arena Fund rather than remaining available to the state's General Fund.
The state's Legislative Revenue Office estimated substantial General Fund transfers associated with that arrangement.
The distinction is straightforward:
No new tax rate does not mean no opportunity cost.
Money that previously supported other public purposes can be redirected without anyone's tax bill increasing.
Some of the relevant tax revenue would be generated specifically by new construction or incremental activity. Other revenue is associated with economic activity that already exists.
The state should disclose the distinction.
Partly, but this argument depends on the counterfactual.
If the Blazers remain in Portland without this specific financing package, much of the income-tax revenue associated with the existing franchise would continue to be collected.
That money is not newly generated by the renovation.
If the Blazers relocate, some player and employee income-tax revenues could disappear. If renovation employment is created, some additional construction-related revenue would arise.
A credible analysis must distinguish:
Calling every dollar of arena-related income tax "new money" is a misleading way to evaluate the public investment.
Financing mechanism: SB 1501, §§3–4 · Our incremental-revenue analysis
The debt does not automatically disappear when a franchise leaves. The final financing documents must identify who pays if arena-related revenue falls short.
SB 1501 §4(3) continues the relevant tax determinations until the specified January following the later of lease expiration or retirement of the applicable state indebtedness. That reporting and transfer mechanism is not a promise that sufficient tax revenue will remain.
SB 1501 §2 limits the state pledges that can be made through the Joint Authority agreement. It must not be read as a blanket limit on bondholders’ rights: SB 5701 separately authorizes Article XI-Q general obligation bonds or, alternatively, certificates of participation.
Before issuance, publish the selected debt structure, obligated parties, pledged revenues, reserves, shortfall responsibility, and enforceable remedies against the franchise and operator. A proposed non-relocation commitment is not a substitute for a debt-service plan.
Yes. Portland receives specified public revenues associated with the Rose Quarter, including a 6% Moda ticket user fee and certain parking receipts.
But existing public revenue should not automatically be treated as a new financial benefit created by the proposed agreement.
If the City already receives a ticket fee, using that fee to support the arena is a decision about allocating existing public revenue.
The central questions are:
The same dollar should never be counted both as an existing public resource and as a new return purchased by the subsidy.
The parking contracts also need precision. Parking Agreement §8.4 permits a 25% administration fee on defined, invoiced and collected non-event parking. The fee does not apply to every City parking dollar. Public-parking drive-up receipts go directly into the City’s account, and the City can inspect and copy public-parking records under §§5.1.3 and 5.6. The arena garage is treated as a private facility despite City ownership, with narrower records access; its receipts must be analyzed separately. Rate-approval and nondiversion provisions also matter.
2024 Parking Agreement, §§5.1.3, 5.6 and 8.4 · Our campus cash-flow analysis
No. But a restricted arena receipt is not the same as money available for schools or other services.
Funding maintenance, preserving a usable public asset, or reducing future taxpayer liabilities can create real public value. A subsidy can also be a deliberate choice to support civic enjoyment. Neither requires pretending the project pays for itself.
The Oregon Arena Fund has specified permitted uses, with additional restrictions on state debt proceeds, transferred tax revenues, and County contributions. A dollar retained there cannot also be counted as unrestricted money for other public services.
The same test applies to a proposed arena “lockbox”: if rent or taxes that would otherwise support public budgets are redirected into the venue, count the foregone revenue and the obligations it actually funds. Do not call the redirection free, and do not dismiss funded maintenance as worthless.
Identify every payment’s recipient, lawful use, and effect on future liabilities. Show financial returns and nonfinancial benefits separately. If the deal needs a net subsidy, state its expected cost and explain why that amount is justified.
SB 1501, §3: Arena Fund uses and restrictions · Our public balance-sheet framework
Some of it could potentially support other public purposes. Other portions are restricted by law or depend on revenue sources that might not exist under a different scenario.
For example, redirecting existing state income-tax revenue from the General Fund has a different opportunity cost from allocating hotel or rental-car tax revenues legally restricted to visitor-related purposes.
Likewise, bonds cannot simply be turned into unrestricted cash; they are issued for specific purposes and repaid with designated revenue.
The proper question is not whether every proposed arena dollar could immediately be spent on schools.
It is:
For each public dollar committed, what is the best legally feasible alternative use, and what benefit does the arena investment provide compared with that alternative?
That is the opportunity-cost analysis public officials should publish.
County funding sources and conditions · SB 1501, §§3–4 · Our opportunity-cost analysis
No law establishes that it disappears forever. But future funding is not guaranteed either.
There are three separate possibilities:
Those possibilities have different costs and probabilities.
The honest question is how difficult it would be to preserve, renew, or replace the financing—not whether the December schedule is either meaningless or permanently fatal.
A government should understand the cost of missing a deadline before allowing that deadline to dictate the terms of a multidecade contract.
SB 1501, §3(4): limits on future funding obligations · SB 5701, §§4–7: authorization periods · December schedule and sources
Yes.
Oregon enacted legislation in 2003 permitting incremental baseball income-tax revenue to support a prospective Major League Baseball stadium.
In 2025, SB 110 increased the potential amount supported by that framework from $150 million to $800 million, plus eligible financing costs.
In 2026, the Legislature authorized a separate income-tax-based financing framework for Moda Center through SB 1501.
These examples establish a recurring legislative willingness to dedicate specified sports-related income taxes to stadium and arena projects.
They do not establish an automatic entitlement for any franchise or guarantee that the Legislature will repeat the policy in every future case.
But they do make it inappropriate to assume that one financing deadline permanently eliminates every possibility of state support.
Yes. State leaders have justified the investment by referring to the arena's statewide economic, cultural, and community importance, not solely the NBA franchise.
That is a meaningful policy position.
If the arena has substantial public value because it hosts concerts, college sports, family events, the Portland Fire, and other activities, some of that value would continue even if the Blazers eventually left.
But that does not mean the Blazers' presence is economically irrelevant.
An NBA team provides recurring attendance, scheduling certainty, sponsorship value, media attention, and other commercial advantages.
The more precise question is:
What level of public investment is justified with the Blazers, and what level would be justified without them?
Those are different scenarios, but neither should automatically be assigned a value of zero.
Other events create both civic benefits and commercial income. Revenue is allocated under venue, promoter, and tenant contracts; it is inaccurate to assume the Blazers’ operator keeps every dollar. Public funding should secure appropriate access, continuity, and financial consideration rather than presume every user benefits equally.
Our arena ownership and funding history · Protections for other tenants
There are valid reasons to prioritize a timely agreement.
Delays can increase construction costs, disrupt financing, postpone improvements, complicate event scheduling, and reduce confidence among the parties.
There are also risks to rushing.
The public could commit to excessive costs, surrender valuable rights, weaken existing protections, or accept incomplete financial information simply to meet a target date.
The responsible approach is to estimate the costs of delay and compare them with the value of obtaining better terms.
A good agreement delivered somewhat later may be preferable to an unfavorable agreement delivered sooner.
But delay itself is not free, and its costs should be disclosed rather than dismissed.
The City, County, and State should maintain a documented contingency plan.
That plan should address:
Officials should evaluate these options before a deadline becomes the sole justification for signing.
Dundon has substantial leverage because the franchise cannot be replicated by another arena operator.
The Blazers provide the arena with a valuable anchor tenant, and the existing state financing structure depends on a long-term management and tenancy arrangement.
But Portland also holds valuable assets and contractual rights.
The City owns the building and substantial surrounding property. Existing agreements bind the franchise to Portland through the current contractual period. The public controls whether it contributes substantial new funding and what conditions it attaches.
Both sides have something to lose if negotiations fail.
The actual balance of leverage depends on the economic and legal alternatives available to each side—not simply on which party makes the stronger public threats.
Portland’s population is not a valuation of its NBA franchise or operating rights. A smaller market can still negotiate; the relevant question is what both sides would gain or lose under realistic alternatives.
Historical video context: the dated clips below are preserved; the written answer above reflects the current record and qualifications.
The league's own commissioner undercuts the “too small to negotiate” talking point. Portland is a real NBA market with real leverage.
Source clip: NBA Commissioner Adam Silver with Brooke Olzendam, Portland Trail Blazers, March 13, 2026.It establishes that he has raised Portland's business costs as an issue. It does not establish that relocating would be economically preferable.
A commercial decision requires comparing the total costs and benefits of operating in Portland with those in a specific alternative market.
That comparison should include taxes, franchise revenue, operating expenses, relocation fees, arena financing, local sponsorships, television markets, public incentives, fan support, and league approval.
A comparison that selects only unfavorable taxes while omitting revenues, public support, and the cost of moving does not establish that another location is better.
An owner participating in negotiations has every incentive to emphasize circumstances that strengthen his bargaining position.
A public statement about costs is evidence of the owner's stated position, not a complete analysis of his outside options.
A counterparty's negotiating reputation can help anticipate their behavior. It cannot establish their actual walk-away price.
Sophisticated owners have reasons to state that they will not make further concessions, even when compromises might ultimately be economically attractive.
An owner may also genuinely have limits beyond which a transaction no longer makes sense.
The City should therefore focus on evidence that can be evaluated independently:
The appropriate response to an aggressive negotiator is neither automatic confrontation nor automatic concession.
It is disciplined analysis of the alternatives.
Yes.
In Raleigh, Dundon's Carolina Hurricanes agreed to a long-term arena arrangement that included:
The transaction demonstrates that Dundon is capable of negotiating complicated, long-term agreements that contain public funding, private commercial benefits, rent, and contractual commitments.
It does not establish that Portland can obtain an identical package.
[Clarification, October 31, 2026: WRAL's account of the lease term sheet describes an exception after the 2038–39 season if the Authority does not make agreed improvements.] WRAL report in the Hurricanes' June 27, 2024 press archive, page 14 (PDF).
Sources: Raleigh News & Observer · Carolina Hurricanes announcement
The development rights were unquestionably an important component of the Raleigh transaction.
But that doesn't establish the precise counterfactual.
We cannot conclude from the completed agreement that Dundon would have refused all rent without those rights, or that Raleigh couldn't have obtained different consideration through another negotiating approach.
The actual transaction was a package of interdependent rights and obligations.
The correct lesson is that arena agreements should be evaluated as complete economic transactions.
Portland should examine not only renovation contributions and rent, but also event profits, concessions, parking, naming rights, premium seating, development rights, existing contractual obligations, and risk allocation.
Raleigh terms and source documents · Hurricanes’ redevelopment announcement
Because statements made during active negotiations aren't independent measurements of willingness to pay.
Every negotiator has an incentive to convince the other side that their current offer represents their limit.
That doesn't mean every statement is false. It means the City should independently evaluate the owner's alternatives and economic incentives.
Statements expressing a desire to stay and statements threatening to leave should face the same test: what independently verifiable evidence supports the claimed alternatives?
The key question is not what Dundon says he wants. It is what economic choices he actually faces.
Yes. Moving an NBA franchise is not a unilateral decision that an owner can implement simply by announcing it.
NBA governance and approval requirements matter, along with the existing contractual arrangements and the financial consequences of relocation.
League approval is not necessarily impossible. Professional sports franchises have relocated before.
But public negotiations should not assume the league would approve a relocation without evaluating its expansion strategy, television-market considerations, contractual commitments, and broader institutional interests.
A relocation scenario should identify the prospective destination, arena, financing, approval pathway, timing, and expected economics.
Exclusive Site Agreement, §1.3: NBA relocation process and City consent · Our relocation analysis
A strong commitment should address more than a nominal 20-year term.
Among the provisions worth evaluating:
A supposedly binding agreement that lets ownership leave after paying an economically attractive fee can become a purchased relocation option.
The value of that option should not be given away unintentionally.
Guarantees expose assets, and bank support uses credit or cash. Security should be valued accordingly. The current Exclusive Site Agreement §4.5 supplies a limited secondary franchise-company repayment obligation after six months of unsuccessful collection from the operator; it is not a general personal guarantee from the owner.
Exclusive Site Agreement, §4.5 · Our continuity and security analysis
Because the price may turn the agreement into an option rather than a meaningful commitment.
Suppose a franchise becomes worth several billion dollars more in another market. A relatively small predetermined exit payment could make relocation economically attractive despite the nominal non-relocation promise.
The public should not confuse compensation for an early departure with preventing that departure.
Some contractual remedies may be necessary, but their design should discourage opportunistic exit and protect the public against actual losses.
The safer starting point is a durable non-relocation obligation, backed by enforceable remedies, rather than a discretionary buyout right granted to the owner.
Yes. Our position is that ownership should invest meaningful capital in a renovation that supports its commercial business.
The August framework assigns the proposed $573 million base renovation funding to the State, City, and County, without a required private contribution to that base. That is a major public concession. It is not proof that the operator has no other costs or obligations.
Rent, maintenance, operating expenses, and enforceable overrun guarantees can have real value. Price them as part of the whole bargain, but do not relabel them as an upfront construction contribution. Conversely, do not count a small construction payment as adequate consideration for valuable commercial rights.
Nor does paying contractors instead of the team eliminate a subsidy’s private benefit. Public ownership of the arena and private commercial benefits can coexist. The operator’s event income is subject to its agreements with promoters, tenants, and other parties; it is not necessarily every dollar spent at every event.
Private capital can reduce public borrowing and risk. If officials accept less of it, they should demonstrate what secured, independently valued consideration the public receives instead. Making the package more attractive to ownership is not, by itself, a public purpose.
City Resolution 37750 and attached August framework · 2024 Arena Operating Lease, §§10.6, 10.9 and 12 · Our classification of the renovation study
Precedent is not proof of value for money. Publicly funded renovations exist; the relevant question is what the public buys in the complete transaction.
Compare renovation scope, lease duration, rent, commercial and development rights, maintenance reserves, overrun responsibility, guarantees, and enforceable public benefits. Distinguish a completed agreement from a proposal, and a public contribution to one work package from public financing of an entire district.
Raleigh, for example, combined public arena funding with a longer team commitment and major surrounding development rights. Those rights and obligations belong in the comparison alongside the renovation percentage.
Portland’s framework proposes that governments fund the $573 million base renovation. That deserves scrutiny even if it is not unprecedented. Other private obligations may be valuable, but they must be priced rather than assumed to make the exchange fair.
A package being less attractive to ownership than another city’s offer does not establish that it is uneconomic or that Portland must offer more. Every additional public concession needs a demonstrated justification and a corresponding public benefit.
Portland’s August framework · Hurricanes’ Raleigh agreement announcement · Our comparison framework
The answer should be informed by independent valuation and comparable agreements.
Potential consideration includes:
Each term must be evaluated in relation to the others.
A high stated rent may be less valuable if it begins years later, is offset by credits, or is paid entirely from revenue the City already contributes.
The public needs a complete cash-flow and contractual valuation rather than a list of attractive-looking provisions.
Revenue participation can align the public's return with the commercial success of a publicly financed asset.
But the mechanism matters.
A share of gross revenue is generally easier to audit than a share of accounting profit. Net-profit arrangements can be affected by management fees, affiliate transactions, depreciation, debt allocation, and other expenses.
A well-designed provision should define covered revenues, allowable deductions, auditing rights, timing, enforcement, and treatment of related-party transactions.
Public participation could apply to appropriate categories of event revenue, naming rights, concessions, sponsorships, or other commercial uses.
Whether revenue participation is preferable to higher fixed rent depends on expected volatility and risk.
Do not confuse an existing trademark royalty with a new naming-rights share. Development Agreement §31.2.4 shares specified Project trademark royalties; §31.2.3 separately restricts Project naming-rights sales. The royalty provision is not a general 50% share of district naming sponsorships.
Reversion under §31.4 remains subject to prior licensees and benefits the operator already received. A new naming program must be expressly authorized and priced.
Development Agreement, §§31.2.3–31.2.4 and 31.4 · Our land and naming-rights analysis
A payment in lieu of taxes, or PILOT, compensates public entities for property-tax revenues that would otherwise be collected from taxable property.
Because Moda is publicly owned, its tax treatment differs from a typical privately owned commercial property.
A negotiated PILOT can provide financial support to the City, County, and school districts.
The relevant questions include the payment amount, escalation, recipients, credits, exemptions, and whether it accurately reflects the value of the property and commercial use.
The proposed $3 million initial PILOT is a meaningful negotiating provision. Its adequacy should be evaluated against the actual property-tax circumstances and the broader transaction.
Proposed rent and PILOT: status and sources · Our PILOT analysis
The City should continue enforcing its existing agreements, maintain the arena, preserve its financing options where possible, and develop a credible alternative operating and capital plan.
It should not assume that failure to reach a new agreement immediately requires abandoning the building or the team.
Nor should it assume that all alternatives are economically equivalent.
The public needs a documented fallback plan that accounts for operations through 2030, potential lease extensions, maintenance requirements, alternate financing, and what a future competition could actually deliver.
A credible alternative makes the City a better negotiator even if that alternative is never used.
Public officials acting through the legally required approval processes must decide whether to commit public assets and funds.
The Joint Authority will have important governance and oversight responsibilities, but it does not eliminate the need for each participating government to fulfill its own legal obligations.
The City Council should understand the full financial package and the consequences of changes to the existing agreements before authorizing binding commitments.
The same principle applies to the State and County.
The public should know which government approves each expenditure, which entity owns each right, and which officials are accountable for enforcement.
Joint Authority ordinance and limits of this authorization · SB 1501, §§2 and 5–7
That is a legitimate policy position.
A community might decide that the Blazers provide enough civic, cultural, and emotional value to justify an explicit financial subsidy.
But making that choice responsibly requires disclosing the subsidy rather than disguising it as an investment expected to pay for itself.
The City should explain:
Public enjoyment matters. It simply shouldn't be confused with direct financial return.
The value of having a team is not proof that this subsidy is necessary to retain it. Show the financing gap and alternatives; do not attribute every existing job or tax dollar to the proposed renovation.
Apply the same evidentiary standard to everyone.
If an opponent of the deal says another operator would pay hundreds of millions more, ask for conditional proposals or comparable transactions.
If a supporter says the Blazers will leave without the proposed subsidy, ask for evidence of a viable relocation destination and its economics.
If someone says the deal has no public cost because taxes won't rise, examine diverted revenue and financing obligations.
If someone says the arena will collapse financially without the Blazers, examine actual operating and maintenance alternatives.
If someone says a renovation will generate enormous economic benefits, ask for incremental revenues, costs, and independently supportable assumptions.
A prediction should be labeled a prediction. A contractual obligation should be distinguished from a negotiating proposal. An estimate should not be presented as an established fact.
The standard should be the evidence, not who is making the argument.
Because operating a publicly owned arena is a commercial service with measurable value.
National operators manage arenas, book concerts, sell sponsorships, administer concessions, arrange events, and operate facilities owned by public institutions and private parties.
Portland should understand what qualified operators would offer in exchange for future operating rights.
A market inquiry could reveal:
The purpose is to learn what the operating contract is worth, not to assume a competitor will necessarily submit a superior offer.
A small authorized negotiating team can do useful work. Independent valuation, comparable deals, and a lawful competitive inquiry can strengthen its position; competition is not the only way to estimate value.
Oregon announced on August 6 that it retained attorney Eric Andalman to advise on the project. SB 1501 §6(2) requires a professional with arena-negotiation expertise to review comparable NBA projects. It does not expressly require a published term-by-term valuation of Portland’s offer.
Our request goes beyond that statutory minimum: disclose the comparison that informed the proposed terms and its material assumptions before the vote. Hiring an expert is a step, not a substitute for showing the public why the bargain is sound.
State announcement of Eric Andalman’s appointment · SB 1501, §6(2) · Our market-test proposal
Related records and earlier coverage: Council's own choice · The transparency requirement
The existing lease constrains when and how a new operating arrangement could become effective.
It does not necessarily prevent the City from conducting a nonbinding market inquiry or exploring post-expiration arrangements.
There is a difference between:
The third can be useful even if the City ultimately renews with Rip City Management.
Any solicitation must describe the rights actually available, existing tenant protections, contractual consents, scheduling requirements, and the possibility that a final arrangement would require agreement from the Blazers.
An RFI is a way of gathering evidence. It is not a promise that another operator can take over immediately.
The 2024 bridge agreements remain the baseline for comparison. Preserve useful contribution limits, repayment rights, and direct franchise commitments; also account for the forbearance, protected subleases, and lender remedies already granted. Any proposed replacement should identify exactly which rights change and what consideration the public receives.
Arena Operating Lease, §§6, 10.9 and 12 · Exclusive Site Agreement · Bridge deal, decoded
That depends on the economics of the venue.
An arena without an NBA or NHL tenant may still generate revenue from concerts, college sports, other professional sports, comedy, family entertainment, conventions, and special events.
But running those events profitably does not automatically make it worthwhile to finance hundreds of millions in renovations.
A viable financing proposal depends on expected operating margins, capital costs, the length of the operating contract, commercial rights, financing conditions, and available tenants.
The correct question is not whether arena operators exist without major-league tenants. They clearly do.
It is what a qualified operator would actually pay or invest for Moda's specific rights under realistic assumptions.
That answer requires market testing, not speculation.
Moody Center example and source · Our proposed Moda market inquiry
It could introduce some negotiating friction.
A franchise owner may prefer an integrated arrangement in which affiliated companies control both the team's tenancy and the arena's commercial operations.
There are legitimate coordination advantages to such an arrangement, and changing it may introduce complexity.
But the possibility of dissatisfaction is not enough to establish that an independent market inquiry would materially increase relocation risk.
There are ways to reduce disruption:
A well-designed inquiry could strengthen negotiations. A poorly designed one could create unnecessary conflict. Both possibilities deserve consideration.
No.
An expression of interest is not a financed, enforceable proposal.
An operator might be happy to manage Moda in exchange for a fee but unwilling to contribute substantial capital.
Another might offer private financing only if guaranteed exclusive commercial rights and a long-term NBA tenant.
To establish a credible alternative, the City needs specific commercial assumptions, financing capacity, binding or conditional commitments, and a clear description of the rights being offered.
The goal should be to move from expressions of interest to comparable proposals, while respecting existing legal obligations.
Potentially, as part of a negotiated arrangement, but that is not an automatic legal right under the existing agreements.
The City could use market information to propose an incumbent renewal on demonstrably competitive terms.
Whether a match process is legally available or commercially acceptable would depend on the contract and procurement structure.
The benefit of market testing is that the City gains an external benchmark even when the incumbent ultimately retains the operating contract.
The most successful competition may be competition that improves an incumbent's offer without requiring a change in operator.
Because it can confer access to substantial commercial opportunities.
Depending on the contract, those may include:
Exclusive rights also prevent potential competitors from bidding for some of those opportunities during the contract term.
If the public grants an exclusive commercial position for 20 years, it should understand its value.
A reasonable question is what rent, revenue participation, private investment, and risk-bearing responsibilities the operator should provide in exchange.
Seattle provides an important precedent, but not a perfect comparison.
The City of Seattle selected an arena redevelopment arrangement through a competitive process. Oak View Group and its partners financed the approximately $1.15 billion transformation of the city-owned arena that became Climate Pledge Arena.
The public retained ownership, and the operator assumed substantial construction and operating responsibilities.
That proves major private financing of a publicly owned arena is possible.
However, the project was linked to attracting an NHL franchise and accommodating a potential NBA team. Those prospects materially improved the investment's economics.
Seattle therefore establishes the feasibility of competitive procurement and large private investment under favorable commercial conditions.
It does not establish that another operator would finance an equivalent Moda renovation without the Blazers.
Moody Center is a useful counterexample to the argument that major private arena investment always requires an NBA or NHL franchise.
The privately financed $375 million arena was developed through a partnership involving Oak View Group, Live Nation/C3 Presents, and the University of Texas.
It hosts university basketball and major concerts, and its commercial structure benefits from university participation and a powerful event-promotion partner.
But Austin's deal also differs significantly from Moda.
Moody was a new purpose-built facility, benefited from university-provided land and infrastructure, and secured a meaningful university event commitment.
Its lesson is that a non-NBA/NHL arena can be commercially attractive under the right structure.
It is not proof that Moda would attract identical financing under different circumstances.
Not necessarily.
Moda already hosts concerts, family entertainment, comedy, sports, and other events that do not depend on the Trail Blazers.
Those activities could continue under an appropriate operating and maintenance arrangement.
But losing the Blazers would remove a major recurring source of attendance, potentially weaken sponsorship and premium-seating revenue, and change the attractiveness of the arena to investors.
The alternatives range from successfully operating a renovated multipurpose venue to maintaining a less profitable facility that requires additional support.
The City should model these outcomes rather than assume either complete abandonment or a seamless replacement of NBA-related revenue.
City report on Moda’s existing activities · Downside scenario and required fallback analysis
The Blazers are a major anchor tenant. We do not have a verified same-period attendance breakdown establishing their exact share.
The City’s FY 2024–25 report lists 1,339,100 attendees across 153 Moda Center events. That total alone does not establish the Blazers’ percentage.
We removed an illustrative split based on an assumed 17,500 attendees per game. A reliable calculation needs actual team and non-team attendance for the same period, including consistent treatment of preseason games and whether attendance means tickets distributed or people entering the venue.
Losing the NBA anchor would materially change the venue’s business. But attendance share is not profit share: event margins, sponsorships, premium seating, and revenue-sharing terms also matter. Publish the event-level operating analysis rather than substitute an attendance estimate for it.
It could attempt to book additional dates, but success isn't guaranteed.
Removing NBA games would free calendar capacity. Whether those dates can be filled profitably depends on artist demand, seasonal touring schedules, venue competition, promoter relationships, audience size, ticket prices, and operating costs.
The right model estimates the incremental events a new operator could realistically obtain, their expected attendance, and their net contribution.
It should also account for lost NBA-related sponsorship, premium seating, and ancillary revenue.
An empty date on the calendar is an opportunity, not guaranteed income.
Some physical improvements may help the arena compete for large touring productions.
Rigging, loading access, sound, backstage facilities, seating configuration, power systems, and scheduling flexibility can matter to promoters.
But the existence of outdated infrastructure does not establish the number of events lost because of it.
A credible economic justification should identify:
Major concerts already play Moda. Its existing success does not eliminate the need for improvements, but claims of substantial lost business should be supported by evidence.
A public investment justified by increased concert activity deserves an independently supportable booking forecast.
City report on current Moda events and improvements · Facility condition report, not a lost-bookings forecast
A league requirement may establish what its member needs. It does not establish who should pay.
Separate safety and accessibility work, existing maintenance duties, documented NBA requirements, and proposed commercial enhancements. A suite or premium club may serve a real business purpose without making its cost a public obligation.
The public should see the applicable written NBA standards or a verifiable itemized account, the work necessary to satisfy them, the cost of each work package, and the entity contractually responsible. If particular proprietary details cannot be released, officials should explain the restriction and provide an independently reviewable public summary.
The same applies to the headline budget: identify who developed the scope, which expert checked it, and what the league actually requested or approved. An assertion that the NBA supports a number is not a technical cost estimate.
The existing lease already has maintenance standards. Price those obligations and the private income-producing benefits before asking taxpayers to fund the work.
Existing Arena Operating Lease, §§5.4 and 10.2 · Published facility assessment · Our funding and ownership history
They describe lifecycle needs under different assumptions, not a priced version of the proposed $573 million renovation or a bill automatically owed by taxpayers.
VSG’s approximately $505 million figure is a 20-year capital forecast. The workbook’s $252.9 million sum of listed costs at a 2024 basis is not a transformation bid. The City’s June 3, 2026 memo adjusts the forecast to about $482 million after excluding work considered unnecessary or completed, and about $402 million without NBA-related items.
The memo also warns that some removed items may still be needed for WNBA or college basketball. The $402 million scenario is not a guaranteed price for operating without the Blazers.
The forecast does not determine which work the operator already owes, what new premium improvements should cost, or what public contribution is necessary. A costed project needs a scope, schedule, inflation assumptions, contingencies, and a funding allocation.
Comparing the City’s proposed $120 million renovation contribution plus up to $275 million in continuing support with $402 million in gross facility needs skips those differences. Compare the same period and scope, subtract available private funding and operating revenue, and account for existing obligations.
We support necessary renovation. We withdrew earlier claims treating the assessment as a complete transformation price or a fixed repair debt. The demand remains firm: reconcile what gets built, who already owes what, and who pays before fixing the public price.
Full FCA workbook · VSG report · City’s June 3 memo · Calculation and correction record · Maintenance claim, corrected
Public ownership does not erase the operator’s contractual duties. The City should value the rights it already has before paying to replace them.
The 2024 Arena Operating Lease sets maintenance standards in §§5.4 and 10.2. Under §10.9, specified Blazers home-game user fees and net public-parking revenue support approved capital work, with the City contribution capped at 50% of the operator’s actual approved expenditures. Section 10.9.1 provides repayment rights if the arena ceases to be the franchise’s NBA home, subject to demand and survival deadlines.
Forbearance, releases, tolling, the age-comparison standard, and the facility’s actual condition affect the scope and recoverable value of maintenance claims. The prospective facility assessment is not a damages award; neither $164 million in damages nor a $120 million settlement floor has been established.
Require a legal and engineering analysis mapping each work item to existing obligations, proposed improvements, and responsible parties. Any release of a valuable public claim should be identified, priced, and justified explicitly in replacement documents.
2024 Arena Operating Lease, §§5.4, 10.2 and 10.9 · Our maintenance analysis and corrections · Facility assessment explorer
That is a genuine downside scenario.
The City might be left responsible for a facility that requires substantial repairs without enough operating revenue to fund them.
But the appropriate response is to estimate that risk and compare it with other options.
Those could include phased capital work, a reduced facility scope, a different operating model, a redevelopment strategy, additional tenants, or a future public-private partnership.
Each has costs and limitations.
The City should publish a downside operating plan showing what happens if the current negotiations fail.
A realistic fallback is important precisely because it makes the bargaining process less dependent on fear of an undefined worst case.
The City has cited more than $600 million in annual regional economic activity associated with the Rose Quarter.
That is a meaningful measure of economic activity, but it is not the same as revenue to the public treasury.
The City's October 21, 2026 impact statement also cites approximately $17.9 million in combined state and local tax revenue for FY 2022–23, including approximately $11.3 million attributed to the Blazers and $6.6 million to other Rose Quarter activities.
Those tax figures are much smaller than gross economic output.
Moreover, neither figure establishes how much activity would genuinely disappear without the proposed subsidy.
Spending at a basketball game may substitute for spending at another Portland entertainment business. Some visitor spending is genuinely incremental; some is redistributed locally.
The economic return should be measured against the alternative world without the proposed investment.
Decades of academic research have generally found that professional sports stadium and arena subsidies produce limited net regional economic growth relative to their cost.
Common explanations include:
The conclusions are not identical for every venue or market. Some projects may generate meaningful benefits, particularly when integrated with broader redevelopment or financed through favorable commercial agreements.
But the literature provides strong reasons to scrutinize claims that a stadium subsidy will repay itself through general economic growth.
A recent synthesis by economist J.C. Bradbury concludes that the conventional economic rationale for public stadium subsidies is poorly supported.
It could.
Restaurants, bars, hotels, transportation providers, and other businesses may benefit from Blazers-related traffic.
Some customers would shift spending to other activities in the region, while some spending—especially from visitors outside the region—could disappear.
The correct analysis should estimate both effects.
It should also separate:
A significant neighborhood impact is not necessarily the same as an equally large citywide economic loss.
Both deserve attention.
Albina Vision Trust is leading an effort to restore housing, neighborhood ownership, commercial opportunity, and community wealth in Lower Albina after decades of displacement.
In September 2026, Portland City Council directed the administration to negotiate over City-owned parcels around Moda Center and Veterans Memorial Coliseum.
The presence of the Blazers may support some development scenarios through foot traffic, demand, and investor confidence.
But it does not follow that Albina's redevelopment becomes impossible without an NBA franchise.
Different components of the Albina Vision may have different economic dependencies.
The public should ask:
Albina's future should be evaluated on its own merits, not used as an undefined consequence of rejecting an arena agreement.
Source: City announcement on Albina Vision Trust negotiations
Not automatically.
The City's September resolution initiated negotiations toward a community-centered redevelopment strategy. It did not finalize a project, transfer property, or guarantee public funding.
The success of Albina Vision projects will depend on land agreements, financing, infrastructure, development economics, and public decisions.
A reduction in Rose Quarter foot traffic could affect some of those economics. But the redevelopment's objectives—housing, community wealth, restorative development, and neighborhood reconnection—exist independently of the NBA franchise.
The appropriate analysis is project-specific.
Officials should identify which outcomes depend on the Blazers and which can proceed with alternative plans.
City’s September 3 announcement: negotiations, not a completed land transfer
They are essential to the analysis.
Moda is a multipurpose public asset. The NBA is its largest-profile tenant, but it is not the only user.
Public investment should benefit the broader community, not solely the owner of one franchise.
The final agreement should establish enforceable protections for other tenants and events, including appropriate scheduling access, fair commercial terms, facility standards, and continuity during renovations.
The Portland Fire's presence strengthens the argument for investing in a high-quality arena while also raising the importance of ensuring that the benefits are not captured exclusively by the Blazers' ownership group.
The broader the arena's public importance, the greater the need to evaluate how its revenues and benefits are allocated.
City framework: venue users and proposed community benefits · Our recommended enforceable protections
Green Bay is a different ownership model, not a subsidy-free stadium precedent. Community ownership is also different from a city government owning a franchise.
Lambeau Field’s $295 million redevelopment in 2001–03 was financed partly by a Brown County sales tax approved by voters. The Packers’ own history documents that public contribution. Community ownership does not establish that a team can never receive public money.
We corrected our earlier claim that this structure prevents stadium subsidies and removed an unsupported claim about the leagues’ motives. Green Bay’s structure does not itself create a route for Portland to acquire an NBA franchise.
The practical demand here is financial alignment: real owner capital, priced commercial rights, enforceable obligations, and a public share of the value taxpayers help create. Publicly owning the building alone does not accomplish that.
Packers’ stadium history: 2001–03 redevelopment · Our proposed public protections
Because keeping the team and accepting any price are not the same thing. We are Blazers fans. We support keeping the team in Portland and renovating a functional, accessible arena.
A deal must do three things: secure the team’s future, maintain a successful multipurpose venue, and purchase enough public value for the money and rights taxpayers contribute. Accomplishing the first two does not automatically accomplish the third.
An explicit, justified subsidy can be a legitimate policy choice. It should not be presented as paying for itself without evidence, or signed before the public can examine the complete bargain.
We are asking whether the public gets enough, and whether the same benefits could be secured on better terms.
Potentially, yes.
Professional sports franchises create civic identity, traditions, shared experiences, tourism, and entertainment. These benefits have genuine value, even when they don't appear in government budgets.
A city may rationally decide that some subsidy is justified by those benefits.
But making that decision responsibly requires distinguishing two things:
If the franchise would remain for $400 million, paying $800 million doesn't purchase twice as much civic pride. It transfers an additional $400 million without necessarily purchasing any additional benefit.
An owner has an incentive to negotiate the highest subsidy possible. The public has an interest in paying no more than necessary for the benefits it wishes to secure.
We should value having the team without treating that value as unlimited.
It's one potentially serious outcome. It is not automatically the worst possible outcome.
Consider three possibilities:
The third is clearly the desired outcome.
The first two cannot be ranked responsibly without estimating their actual costs.
If keeping the team required sacrificing an extraordinary amount of public resources, it could become more expensive than losing it. Alternatively, the lost civic and economic benefits could be large enough to justify a considerable investment.
That is why the city needs a full comparison of the alternatives—not a comparison that assumes every non-deal scenario is catastrophic.
That depends on how much additional negotiating risk the city would incur by asking for better terms.
A difficult counterparty does not eliminate the need to negotiate. It increases the importance of understanding the counterparty's alternatives.
An owner refusing a concession is not necessarily the same as an owner being willing to relocate over that concession.
Suppose increasing annual rent by $2 million would produce $40 million in additional nominal revenue over 20 years. The relevant question is whether asking for that rent creates a relocation risk large enough to outweigh the additional value.
The answer cannot be established merely by observing that the owner is unhappy with the demand.
Avoiding confrontation is not the same thing as minimizing economic risk.
It should compare the expected public value of each feasible alternative.
A useful framework includes:
Costs: Upfront public capital, financing interest, continuing maintenance, operating subsidies, foregone revenue, opportunity costs, and potential liabilities.
Returns: Rent, payments in lieu of taxes, revenue sharing, additional tax receipts actually caused by the project, retained development rights, asset value, and other recoverable financial benefits.
Nonfinancial benefits: Civic enjoyment, community access, neighborhood activity, jobs, cultural significance, accessibility, and public-interest development.
Risks: Relocation, construction overruns, operating losses, default, delayed financing, litigation, and unanticipated future capital requirements.
These should be compared using consistent time periods and discounted cash flows rather than simply adding together dollar amounts occurring decades apart.
Nonfinancial benefits should be reported separately when they cannot be reliably monetized.
Compare complete packages, not just the midpoint between two negotiating demands. Count only incremental benefits relative to the alternative: land the City already owns is not a new gift from the operator, and an existing public fee is not newly created revenue.
Yes, and that matters.
The City Council's August 12 resolution explicitly directs the administration to negotiate a return on investment, enforceable protections, and community benefits. Councilors successfully added proposed rent and strengthened other terms during the process.
Those are meaningful improvements.
But a proposed contractual right is not an accepted and enforceable contractual right.
Until the final agreements are completed, the public cannot determine whether the proposals survived negotiation, whether they have exceptions or offsets, and whether they are secured against default.
The appropriate standard is to judge the final contractual package, not either side's public negotiating position.
The owner is entitled to pursue a return, not to have taxpayers guarantee it. Purchasing a professional sports franchise is a commercial investment.
But the acquisition price doesn't create an automatic obligation for taxpayers to finance the owner's operating infrastructure.
The transaction should account for:
The public's investment should be evaluated independently of the owner's acquisition cost.
An offer ranking poorly on an owner-preference index does not establish that it is unprofitable, that relocation is superior, or that further concessions are necessary. The public’s foregone revenue, borrowing costs, and risks deserve the same scrutiny as the owner’s costs. Any additional concession needs a demonstrated justification and a corresponding public benefit.
The original clips now accompany the maintained answers: relocation and the NBA’s position, Portland’s negotiating leverage, and the financing deadline. Back to the complete FAQ.
Portland is negotiating one of the largest public investments in a professional sports facility in Oregon's history. The Trail Blazers are an important part of our city's identity, the Moda Center needs investment, and losing an NBA franchise would carry real costs.
None of those facts tells us what taxpayers should pay.
The central question is whether Portland is purchasing enough public value in exchange for the money, assets, rights, and risks it is being asked to contribute.
This FAQ examines the strongest arguments on every side, including the practical risks of negotiating too aggressively, the constraints imposed by existing leases, and the possibility that an alternative arena arrangement would be less attractive than supporters of competition hope.
Our position: We want the Trail Blazers to remain in Portland. We support renovating the Moda Center. We believe the final agreement must be affordable, independently evaluated, transparent, and enforceable.
November 1 consolidation and corrections: Older answers are merged into this FAQ; their links and videos remain available. We corrected the Green Bay subsidy claim, acknowledged Oregon’s retained expert, distinguished deadlines from statutory expiration, replaced blanket status claims with dated records, removed the unsupported attendance split and unexplained $1.15 billion headline, and clarified public benefits and private obligations. Historical clips are not substitutes for current documents.
How to read this FAQ: The August 12, 2026 term sheet is a nonbinding negotiating framework, not a completed lease. Dollar figures may represent proposed commitments, conditional ceilings, estimates, or actual legal obligations. We distinguish these deliberately. Requests for disclosure, proposed protections, and judgments about a fair price are our recommendations; they should not be read as claims that the law already requires them. Hypothetical examples are not estimates of this transaction.
The Trail Blazers matter enormously to Portland.
The Moda Center needs significant investment.
The State, County, and City have legitimate reasons to consider public participation in a renovation.
Dundon has substantial leverage, and the risk of losing the team deserves serious consideration.
But none of those propositions establishes that the current proposed financial terms are the best achievable terms, or that additional demands would cause the franchise to leave.
Portland owns valuable assets. It has existing contractual rights. It controls substantial public financing. And it has years of operating history and a future market that can be evaluated.
A credible negotiating strategy should measure both sides' alternatives, independently value the public's contribution, and seek a defensible return.
The objective is not to punish the owner or prevent a renovation.
It is to ensure that twenty years from now, Portlanders can look at the transaction and say that their public institutions protected their interests.
Keep the Blazers. Renovate Moda. Make a deal, not a donation.
Legislation and financing
Portland and Multnomah County
League and comparable arenas
Our deeper analysis
Satisfied with the answers, or want them on the record?
Ask Council for a complete, funded and enforceable deal →Source links appear throughout the FAQ and in the further reading; bridge-lease citations (§) are to the executed 2024 documents under Ordinance 191857. Figures follow the public balance sheet and the September 8 and 11 corrections in the contract review.