How much is keeping the Blazers worth to Portland?
Keeping the Blazers is worth something real. This page lets you set that number yourself — then shows what the ask costs against it, and what else the same money buys.
~$900M Modeled — the 20-year opportunity cost of the ask, with $0 required from ownership.
The honest question is never “is the team worth it?” It’s “is this deal worth it, when every peer city paid less for more?”
How these numbers fit together
The same scope, escalated and repeated over 20 years: $505M. Inside it: ~$164M genuine repair, ~$341M revenue-generating upgrades.
This is the current number. The earlier “$600M ask” you may have seen was the floated figure this draft replaced.
The balance sheet’s ~$850M–1B modeled core sits inside this range.
Not the $2.5M-per-year maintenance reserve — that is a separate recommended term.
Verified primary document · Calculated arithmetic from verified inputs · Modeled assumptions disclosed & adjustable. Every line’s paper trail: the Public Balance Sheet.
Vs. Dundon’s offer
By your number, the ask over 20 years costs $450M more than the Blazers are worth — and he chips in $0.
Where the difference could go
Public money that, by your own number, didn’t need to go to the arena. For scale: the deal pulls ~$36–41M a year out of Oregon’s General Fund — schools, parks, public safety — into a fund spendable only on this building.
The ~$900M opportunity cost of the ask is the conservative 20-year figure Modeled; the ledger is below. “Walk away” means bidding the publicly-owned building to a competitive operator.
A ~$1 billion difference over 20 years — the price of this deal, not the team. Hold the owner to what he already owes, and saying no pays. The owner’s signed lease already requires the leverage figures; only their exact scope is contested, so we hold them above the audit-proof floor rather than bake them in.
The whole ledger — with the team, and without
The Blazers are worth a fortune. The deal is about who keeps that money:
The full accounting — every line, both ways — one yearly number per column.
Verified public record / enacted law / executed lease · Modeled sourced estimate — terms not public · “↔” marks offsetting lines.
| Line item | With the Blazersthe proposed deal | Withoutnew operator, City’s building | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Public capital & financing — annualized | |||
| State bond repayment$531–623M debt service over the life, avg ~$29M/yr (Oregon LFO) — repaid by diverting income-tax growth out of the General Fund (LRO). | −~$29M/yr | $0 | Verified |
| City capital + enhanced upkeep$120M capital + ~$280–285M upkeep pledge (~$14M/yr). Without: baseline upkeep only. | −~$20M/yr | $0 | Modeled |
| County contribution~$88M (~$130M w/ interest, Comm. Moyer’s est.) over 20 yrs — against the county’s ~$80M four-year deficit. | −~$6M/yr | $0 | Modeled |
| Real repairs the building needs either way↔ the ~$164M first-class / life-safety floor — buried in the deal’s budget; without, pay-as-you-go, or a competitive operator funds it. | in the budget | −~$8M/yr | Modeled |
| Subtotal — public capital | −$44 to $56M/yr | −$8M to ~$0/yr | |
| 2 · Public operating revenue — per year · as recited June 24, pending confirmation vs. the recording | |||
| Blazers user fees↔ lost if the team leaves | +$2.9M | $0 | Modeled |
| Non-Blazers user feeslarger than the Blazers’ slice — kept either way | +$4.3M | +$4.3M | Modeled |
| ParkingBlazers $1.4M + non-Blazers ~$2.5M; the non-Blazers share persists | +$3.9M | +$2.5M | Modeled |
| Coliseum, rents & visitor-facilities IGA$0.65M + $1.2M + $0.53M — unchanged either way | +$2.4M | +$2.4M | Modeled |
| Rent from the operator↔ a competitive operator pays real rent the $1 deal doesn’t — modeled, terms not public | +$1/yr | +$2–6M/yr | Modeled |
| Naming + revenue share to the City↔ the deal routes naming 100% to the operator; a bid could share it — modeled, terms not public | $0 | +$3–7M/yr | Modeled |
| Subtotal — operating revenue | ~+$13.5M/yr | ~+$9.2M + operator (modeled) | |
| 3 · Other costs, leverage & tax | |||
| Operating cost of the buildinghistorically near break-even — the fees above ≈ cover opex either way | ≈ revenue | ≈ revenue | Modeled |
| Property tax forgoneORS 307.171 sports-facility exemption — identical either way; the building stays public | −$1.2M/yr | −$1.2M/yr | Modeled |
| “First-class” repair claim (§10.2)↔ the lease makes the operator keep the arena NBA-caliber at his own cost — a ~$164M repair floor ranging up toward the full renovation. The deal forgives that claim; without, it’s kept. Contested & tolled — leverage, not booked cash. | −$164–600M | +$164–600M | Modeled |
| Operator’s 50/50 match + clawback (§10.9)↔ for the ~4 remaining bridge years the operator funds capital, City reimbursement capped at ~$4.6M/yr, and repays the City if the team leaves (§10.9.1). The deal erases the match and the cap. | $0 | +~$18M/ 4 yrs | Modeled |
| State income tax if the team leavesthe Blazers’ payroll tax is diverted to the Arena Fund regardless (SB 1501 §4); leaving keeps the smaller event/away-team tax in the General Fund — how the diversion works | diverted | stays in GF | Modeled |
| 4 · Jobs — direction only (no salary figures; the softest data) | |||
| Event-day hourly (concessions, ushers, security)roughly a wash either way | baseline | ≈ wash | Modeled |
| Full-time building operationsunchanged to slightly up — concerts need more booking & marketing | baseline | ≈ / up | Modeled |
| Team front officethe real loss if the team leaves — but the same owner already cut more than 70 business-office staff weeks before the earlier floated ~$600M ask (KOIN / Willamette Week). Scrutinize the counterparty. | ▼ already cutting | ▼ lost | Modeled |
| Skilled production / stagehands (IATSE)up — concerts are far more production-intensive than basketball | baseline | ▲ more | Modeled |
Reading it honestly. Fees and parking roughly cover the ordinary cost of running the building, so the real swing is capital: $880M–$1.11B of new public money for $0 in new rent, naming or revenue share, against ~$0 without (the ~$164M of real repairs are owed either way). The Without column’s operator lines are modeled ranges — Seattle, D.C., Orlando, Milwaukee and San Antonio all collect rent on publicly-owned arenas, but Portland’s figure isn’t public, so it never sums into a headline. Peer splits: /deals; a fair deal’s term-by-term value: /terms.
The Blazers aren’t the ceiling. The operator is.
The Blazers’ own affiliate runs Moda as a basketball arena with events on the side. A professional operator runs the building as the business — and the gap shows up in the numbers.
- ~150 events a year — the City’s own figure.
- A ~30-year-old building its own backers say touring acts now bypass — “because the arena can’t meet modern production needs.”
- Run by the team’s affiliate, whose priority is the ~41 basketball nights — not filling the other 300.
- ~140 ticketed events + ~$90M gross a year.
- Pollstar Arena of the Year, 2024; Billboard’s #1 venue in its size class.
- A dedicated operator whose entire business is keeping the building full.
Portland is a bigger TV market than Austin (#23 vs #34), with a nearly identical metro — and NBA-anchored arenas book even more (the United Center and Madison Square Garden run 200–320 events a year). The City’s own renovation pitch is that touring acts bypass Portland — so bid the building to an operator whose whole job is filling it, and make them pay to run it, the way Seattle did.
Sources & method
Moda’s ~150 events/year and the “touring acts bypass Portland” framing are the City’s and Blazers’ own, from the 2026 renovation materials (portland.gov/council/moda-facts) and KOIN’s reporting. Moody Center figures — ~140 ticketed events, ~$89.8M gross (FY2025), Pollstar Arena of the Year 2024, Billboard #1 in its size class — from Billboard / CultureMap and moodycenteratx.com. Market ranks: Nielsen DMA. Honest caveat: Moda reports strong concert sell-through (83–94%), so the point is dated infrastructure, lost tours, and operator headroom — not an empty building; the two event counts are tallied differently, so treat them as directional.
The ~$900M is a premium — not a repair bill
Keeping Portland’s arena sound and safe costs about $164M, pay-as-you-go. This deal commits more than six times that. The gap is a premium — the price of keeping the team on the owner’s terms:
Even on the most conservative public count, the premium is ~$720M — still the single largest line in the deal.
| Take the deal | Say no — run it as ours | |
|---|---|---|
| Public cost, 20 yrs | ~$1.0–1.1B committed | ~$164M to maintain our own building — pay-as-you-go, no bond |
| Operator pays | $0 private capital | Stays bound by his “first-class” upkeep duty (his sole cost), plus a ~$20–25M clawback if he leaves |
| Public’s return | $0 — no rent, share, or naming | Keeps the option to bid it out (peers got 18–62%) and every non-Blazers dollar |
| If the Blazers leave | Locked into the commitment to keep them | A small, largely-offsettable loss (~$3–8M/yr) — far below the “$670M” rhetoric |
| The premium | ~$900M on top of upkeep | $0 premium — but the team-retention guarantee is forfeited |
Held honest: the deal side also buys ~25 years of team retention the maintain-only path forfeits. But a ~$900M premium to keep the team, with nothing from the owner, is a steep way to buy it when every peer city’s owner paid 18–62% of the renovation.
He already owes a first-class arena — at his own cost
This is the clause the new owner wants erased. His signed lease requires the arena be kept “suitable for professional basketball arenas in the NBA” (§10.2) at “Tenant’s sole cost” (§5.4) — by the contract’s own words, the “first-class” upgrades the public is now being asked to fund are his obligation. Councilor Novick, June 24: “Why haven’t we filed a lawsuit asking for $600 million?”
Enforcement is tolled during the bridge term and the exact scope is contestable — leverage, not booked cash. Read §10.2 / §5.4 in the lease → · The clause-by-clause case: the renovation study.
Owners pay. Portland's deal is the outlier.
The precedents split into two honest tiers: full rebuilds a private operator financed 100%, and comparable renovations where the operator funded 18–62% of the capital. Portland’s scope sits in the renovation tier.
| Arena (public-owned) | Operator's capital share | How it was selected |
|---|---|---|
| Full redevelopment — operator financed 100% (the demonstrated ceiling) | ||
| Climate Pledge Arena — Seattle | ~$1.15B (100%) | Competitive RFP; City kept ownership, long-term lease; OVG absorbed all overruns |
| UBS Arena — Belmont, NY | ~$1.1B (100%) | State RFP; public land via ground lease (~$2.24M/yr + ~$50M upfront) |
| Comparable renovation — operator funded 18–62% (Portland's realistic band) | ||
| Rocket Mortgage FieldHouse — Cleveland | ~$115M (62%) | Negotiated; team absorbed all overruns |
| Little Caesars Arena — Detroit | ~$539M (60%) | Negotiated DDA deal (weak public revenue return otherwise) |
| Capital One Arena — Washington, D.C. | $285M (36%) | P3 sale-leaseback; team funded its share + all overruns |
| State Farm Arena — Atlanta | $50M+ (26%+) | Negotiated; team absorbed overruns; $200M+ non-relocation penalty |
| Indianapolis (Gainbridge) | ~$65M (18%) | Negotiated; team capital share + commitments |
| PROPOSED Moda Center — Portland | $0 (0%) | Negotiated, no competitive bid; $1/yr rent; no rent, revenue share, or naming share to the public — the July 17 draft adds a $3M/yr tax offset and a drafted relocation penalty |
Seattle and Belmont are larger, newer buildings — proof a publicly-owned arena can be bid out with zero public construction dollars, not Portland's target; the renovation tier is the apples-to-apples band for Portland's ~$253M scope. Peer figures sourced on /deals.
The deal is worse than the lease already in force
You don't have to imagine a fairer arrangement — Portland signed one in 2024.
- The operator does the capital work and pays for it.
- The City reimburses at most 50% — capped at the Blazers-game fees + parking it collects (~$4.6M/yr).
- “All capital costs… beyond the City’s limited contribution are the responsibility of Rip City Management” (§10.9).
- If the Blazers leave, the operator repays the City (§10.9.1).
- $365M+ from the public.
- $0 base capital from the operator.
- The clawback returns in the July 17 draft — the 50% cap and the match are still gone.
A downgrade from the contract Portland is operating under right now. Councilor Avalos, June 24: “I will not accept anything less than half.”
Sources & method
Public commitments: Oregon LFO Fiscal Impact and Legislative Revenue Office Revenue Impact for SB 1501/SB 5701; the Mayor's Office “ModaFuture” page; reporting from OPB, KGW, and the Oregonian. Fees and parking are the FY 2024-25 figures stated at the June 24 work session, cross-checked against the Crossroads Consulting study. Peer capital shares and the §10.9 terms are sourced across /deals, /terms, /renovation, and /economic-impact. Caveats: the $1.02–1.11B range includes full projected bond interest (a conservative public count tops $880M); the ~$36–41M/yr General Fund figure averages the LRO's per-biennium numbers; the first-class duty is leverage, not recoverable cash; competitive-bid investment is upside, not booked money. We'll correct anything the records contradict.
Owning a billion-dollar asset is a responsibility.
Making it sweat is the job.
The Council doesn't have to choose between the Blazers and a fair deal. It has to refuse to commit ~$1 billion until the public gets value for what it owns. The alternative is priced. The leverage is real. Use it.
Tell the Council to make it sweat →