By your number, Dundon’s ~$900M deal costs $450M more than the Blazers are worth — and he chips in $0.
Public money that, by your own number, didn’t need to go to the arena. For scale, the deal already pulls ~$36–41M a year out of Oregon’s General Fund — schools, parks, public safety — into a fund that can only be spent on this building; the County is adding ~$88M while facing an ~$80M budget hole.
The deal’s ~$900M is the conservative 20-year public cost (the full range is $880M–$1.11B). “Walk away” means bidding the publicly-owned building to a competitive operator — which can run it at a profit (the full ledger and the operator comparison are below). Only the owner can decide to move the team; this is about what the public should pay to keep it.
A ~$1 billion difference over 20 years — the price of this deal, not the team. Make the owner honor what he already owes, and saying no doesn’t just cost less — it pays. The leverage figures aren’t soft — the owner’s signed lease already requires them. Only their exact dollar value turns on scope, so we keep them above the audit-proof floor rather than bake them in.
The Blazers are worth a fortune. This deal is really about one thing — who keeps that money:
So here is the full accounting — every line, both ways — with one yearly number per column you can multiply by 20. The bottom line is at the very end.
Confidence on every line: High public record / enacted law / executed lease · Med sourced estimate · Est modeled — terms not public. Offsetting lines are marked “↔”.
| Line item | With the Blazersthe proposed deal | Withoutnew operator, City’s building | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Public capital & financing — annualized | |||
| State bond repayment$531–623M debt service over the life, avg ~$29M/yr (Oregon LFO). The $365M is net proceeds — a declared intention, not a legal obligation (SB 1501 §3(4)) — repaid by diverting income-tax growth out of the General Fund (LRO). | −~$29M/yr | $0 | High |
| City capital + enhanced upkeep$120M capital + ~$280–285M upkeep pledge (~$14M/yr). Without: only baseline upkeep on a building it already owns. | −~$20M/yr | $0 | Med |
| County contribution~$88M (~$130M w/ interest, Comm. Moyer’s est.) over 20 yrs — against the county’s ~$80M four-year deficit. | −~$6M/yr | $0 | Med |
| Real repairs the building needs either way↔ the ~$164M first-class / life-safety floor. With the deal it’s buried inside the $600M; without, the public pays it pay-as-you-go — or a competitive operator funds it. | in the $600M | −~$8M/yr | Med |
| Subtotal — public capital | −$44 to $56M/yr | −$8M to ~$0/yr | |
| 2 · Public operating revenue — per year · as recited June 24, pending confirmation vs. the recording | |||
| Blazers user fees↔ lost if the team leaves | +$2.9M | $0 | Med |
| Non-Blazers user feesalready larger than the Blazers’ slice — the City keeps this either way | +$4.3M | +$4.3M | Med |
| ParkingBlazers $1.4M + non-Blazers ~$2.5M; the non-Blazers share persists | +$3.9M | +$2.5M | Med |
| Coliseum, rents & visitor-facilities IGA$0.65M + $1.2M + $0.53M — unchanged either way | +$2.4M | +$2.4M | Med |
| Rent from the operator↔ a competitive operator pays real rent the $1 deal doesn’t — modeled, terms not public | +$1/yr | +$2–6M/yr | Est |
| Naming + revenue share to the City↔ the deal routes naming 100% to the operator; a bid could share it — modeled, terms not public | $0 | +$3–7M/yr | Est |
| Subtotal — operating revenue | ~+$13.5M/yr | ~+$9.2M + operator (modeled) | |
| 3 · Other costs, leverage & tax | |||
| Operating cost of the buildinghistorically near break-even — the fees above ≈ cover opex, so operating roughly washes and the capital line is the real swing | ≈ revenue | ≈ revenue | Med |
| Property tax forgoneORS 307.171 sports-facility exemption — identical either way; the building stays public | −$1.2M/yr | −$1.2M/yr | Med |
| “First-class” repair claim (§10.2)↔ the lease makes the operator keep the arena NBA-caliber at his own cost — a ~$164M repair floor ranging up toward the full ~$600M renovation (Councilor Novick asked why the City hasn’t sued for it). The deal asks the City to forgive that claim; without, it’s kept as leverage. Contested & tolled — leverage, not booked cash. | −$164–600M | +$164–600M | Med |
| Operator’s 50/50 match + clawback (§10.9)↔ for the ~4 yrs the bridge lease still runs, the operator funds capital with the City’s reimbursement capped at ~$4.6M/yr (~$18M over 4 yrs; last year’s match was ~$4.5M) and repays the City if the team leaves (§10.9.1). The deal erases the match and the cap — the public funds 100%. | $0 | +~$18M/ 4 yrs | Med |
| State income tax if the team leavesthe Blazers’ payroll tax is diverted to the Arena Fund regardless (captured as an “operating organization,” SB 1501 §4); leaving simply keeps the smaller event/away-team tax in the General Fund — how the diversion works | diverted | stays in GF | Med |
| 4 · Jobs — direction only (no salary figures; the softest data) | |||
| Event-day hourly (concessions, ushers, security)roughly a wash; slightly less consistent scheduling without a set NBA season | baseline | ≈ wash | Est |
| Full-time building operationsunchanged to slightly up — a concert calendar needs more active booking & marketing | baseline | ≈ / up | Est |
| Team front officethe real loss if the team leaves — but the same owner already cut more than 70 business-office staff (incl. a senior VP), weeks before asking the public for ~$600M (KOIN / Willamette Week). Scrutinize the counterparty — not the team. | ▼ already cutting | ▼ lost | Med |
| Skilled production / stagehands (IATSE)up — concerts are far more production-intensive than basketball | baseline | ▲ more | Est |
Reading it honestly. The ~$12M/yr the City collects in fees and parking roughly covers the ordinary cost of running a building it already owns (historically near break-even), so the real swing is the capital: this deal commits $880M–$1.11B of new public money for $0 in new rent, naming or revenue share, while the alternative commits ~$0 (the real ~$164M of repairs are owed either way). The Without column’s operator rent, naming and revenue-share lines are modeled ranges — a public owner provably can collect them (Seattle keeps its arena and charges OVG rent; D.C., Orlando, Milwaukee and San Antonio all collect rent on theirs), but the exact Portland figure isn’t public, so we never sum it into a headline. FY24-25 fee & parking figures are as recited at the June 24 work session, pending confirmation against the official recording. Peer splits are detailed in /deals; the term-by-term value of a fair deal is in /terms.
A publicly-owned building is only worth as much as how hard it’s worked. The Blazers’ own affiliate runs Moda as a basketball arena with events on the side. A professional operator runs the building as the business — and the gap shows up in the numbers.
Moody Center in Austin has no NBA or NHL tenant — just a college basketball team. A professional operator books it to ~140 ticketed events and ~$90M a year, and it won Pollstar’s Arena of the Year in 2024 and Billboard’s #1 spot in its size class. The building thrives on events alone — the very thing Portland is told it needs a billion-dollar team subsidy to protect.
And Portland isn’t too small. It’s a bigger TV market than Austin (#23 vs #34), with a nearly identical metro. Arenas that do have an NBA team book even more — the United Center and Madison Square Garden run 200–320 events a year. The Blazers’ ~41 dates are additive to a full calendar, not a substitute for one. What caps Moda isn’t the market or the team — it’s who runs it, and how hard. And here’s the tell: the City’s own pitch for the renovation is “acts bypass Portland, we need more shows.” Exactly — so bid the building to an operator whose whole job is filling it, and make them pay to run it, the way Seattle did.
Moda Center’s ~150 events/year and the “touring acts bypass Portland / can’t meet modern production needs” framing are the City’s and Blazers’ own, from the 2026 renovation materials (portland.gov/council/moda-facts) and KOIN’s reporting. Moody Center figures — ~140 ticketed events, ~$89.8M gross, 854K paid attendance (FY2025), Pollstar Arena of the Year 2024, Billboard #1 in its size class (2022/2024/2025) — from Billboard / CultureMap and moodycenteratx.com. Market ranks: Nielsen DMA #23 Portland vs #34 Austin. Anchored-arena counts (United Center, MSG: ~200–320 events) from venue reporting. Honest caveat: Moda’s operator publicly reports strong concert sell-through (83–94%), so the point is the building’s dated infrastructure and lost tours — conceded by the renovation’s own backers — plus the headroom a professional operator captures, not that Moda sits empty. “~150” (Moda) and “~140 ticketed” (Moody) are counted differently across sources; treat as directional, not a precise head-to-head.
Actually keeping Portland’s arena sound and safe costs about $164M, pay-as-you-go. This deal commits more than six times that. The gap is a premium — the price of keeping the team on the owner’s terms:
Even on the most conservative public count, the premium is ~$720M — still the single largest line in the deal.
The honest questionIt isn’t whether the Blazers are worth something. It’s whether ~$900M — with $0 from the owner — is the right price, when every peer city’s owner paid 18–62% of the renovation and the public kept ownership.
| Take the deal | Say no — run it as ours | |
|---|---|---|
| Public cost, 20 yrs | ~$1.0–1.1B committed | ~$164M to maintain our own building — pay-as-you-go, no bond |
| Operator pays | $0 private capital | Stays bound by his “first-class” upkeep duty (his sole cost), plus a ~$20–25M clawback if he leaves |
| Public’s return | $0 — no rent, share, or naming | Keeps the option to bid it out (peers got 18–62%) and every non-Blazers dollar |
| If the Blazers leave | Locked into the commitment to keep them | A small, largely-offsettable loss (~$3–8M/yr) — far below the “$670M” rhetoric |
| The premium | ~$900M on top of upkeep | $0 premium — but the team-retention guarantee is forfeited |
Held honest: the premium isn’t pure waste — the deal side also buys ~25 years of team retention the maintain-only path forfeits. The point isn’t that keeping the team is worthless; it’s that ~$900M, with nothing from the owner, is a steep way to buy it when peers paid far less and made the operator chip in.
This is the clause the new owner wants erased — because the lease defines “first-class” about as expansively as a contract can. In its own words:
In plain English: whatever today’s NBA standard requires, the operator is already contractually bound to provide — and to pay for it himself. The “first-class” upgrades the public is being asked to fund for ~$600M are, by the contract’s own words, his obligation. That is why the City quietly agreed not to enforce it in 2024, why the new owner wants it erased in a new lease, and why Councilor Novick asked on June 24: “Why haven’t we filed a lawsuit asking for $600 million?”
The honest caveat: the City tolled (paused) enforcement during the bridge term, so it’s pressable at lease-end, not today; and the “equivalent age” language gives the operator a defense on the exact scope — so the figure (the ~$164M repair floor up toward the full renovation) would be settled or litigated. But the obligation itself is in black and white. Read §10.2 / §5.4 in the lease →
A publicly-owned arena can be bid out — cities do it. The precedents split into two honest tiers: full rebuilds a private operator financed 100%, and comparable renovations where the operator funded 18–62% of the capital. Portland's scope sits in the renovation tier — where the realistic target is a real operator share, not $0.
| Arena (public-owned) | Operator's capital share | How it was selected |
|---|---|---|
| Full redevelopment — operator financed 100% (the demonstrated ceiling) | ||
| Climate Pledge Arena — Seattle | ~$1.15B (100%) | Competitive RFP; City kept ownership, long-term lease; OVG absorbed all overruns |
| UBS Arena — Belmont, NY | ~$1.1B (100%) | State RFP; public land via ground lease (~$2.24M/yr + ~$50M upfront) |
| Comparable renovation — operator funded 18–62% (Portland's realistic band) | ||
| Rocket Mortgage FieldHouse — Cleveland | ~$115M (62%) | Negotiated; team absorbed all overruns |
| Little Caesars Arena — Detroit | ~$539M (60%) | Negotiated DDA deal (weak public revenue return otherwise) |
| Capital One Arena — Washington, D.C. | $285M (36%) | P3 sale-leaseback; team funded its share + all overruns |
| State Farm Arena — Atlanta | $50M+ (26%+) | Negotiated; team absorbed overruns; $200M+ non-relocation penalty |
| Indianapolis (Gainbridge) | ~$65M (18%) | Negotiated; team capital share + commitments |
| PROPOSED Moda Center — Portland | $0 (0%) | Negotiated, no competitive bid; $1/yr rent; no rent, revenue share, naming share, or relocation penalty to the public |
Full-redevelopment figures (Seattle, Belmont) are larger, newer buildings — shown as proof that a publicly-owned arena can be bid out with zero public construction dollars, not as Portland's target. The renovation tier is the apples-to-apples comparison for Portland's ~$253M scope. Peer figures sourced on /deals; private-investment figures from public reporting.
You don't have to imagine a fairer arrangement — Portland signed one in 2024.
So the proposed deal isn’t just below market — it’s a downgrade from the contract Portland is operating under right now. That’s the flip Councilor Avalos named on June 24: “I will not accept anything less than half.”
Public commitments: Oregon LFO Fiscal Impact and Legislative Revenue Office Revenue Impact for SB 1501/SB 5701; the Mayor's Office “ModaFuture” page; reporting from OPB, KGW, and the Oregonian. The City's collected fees and parking are the FY 2024-25 figures stated on the record at the June 24 work session, cross-checked against the Crossroads Consulting study (City-reported). Peer-arena capital shares and the bridge-lease §10.9 terms are sourced across /deals, /terms, /renovation, and /economic-impact. Caveats we hold ourselves to: the $1.02–1.11B range is an estimate that includes full projected bond interest (a conservative public count tops $880M); the ~$36–41M/yr General Fund figure is a per-year average of the LRO's per-biennium numbers; the first-class duty (~$164M face) is leverage the owner’s signed lease already grants, not recoverable cash; and competitive-bid private investment is upside the City could pursue, not money already booked. We never present an estimate as a fact, and we'll correct anything the records contradict.
The Council doesn't have to choose between the Blazers and a fair deal. It has to do the one thing a steward of public property must: refuse to commit ~$1 billion until the public gets value for what it owns. The alternative is priced. The leverage is real. Use it.
Tell the Council to make it sweat →