Why Portland’s situation is nothing like Seattle
Seattle had no building ownership and no covenant. Portland has both — and a buyer who just paid $4.25B for a Portland franchise.
Campaign clip: Wake Up Rip City podcast, July 2026, at 19:38.No one can prove whether an owner would ever move — so the public's protection isn't a prediction. It's two things Council controls: pricing what a move would actually cost him, and writing real relocation security into the permanent lease. By that measure Portland negotiates from strength: the City owns the building, the team operates it for $1 a year, and any move still needs NBA approval.
No one can prove whether an owner would move — so this page prices it. Leaving means breaching signed contracts the City can enforce in court, paying the league’s fee, and rebuilding somewhere else. The floor is in the billions, wherever the destination.
$1.5–5.7B Modeled — the full-friction cost of actually moving the team.
Relocation fear is the pressure behind every bad arena vote. The signed lease says the fear is negotiable — write the protection into the permanent lease instead.
Verified primary document · Calculated arithmetic from verified inputs · Modeled assumptions disclosed & adjustable. Every line’s paper trail: the Public Balance Sheet.
Tom Dundon doesn't own the Moda Center — the City of Portland does. The team conveyed the building to the City in the 2024 bridge lease and operates it for $1 a year. Relocating means breaching signed contracts, fighting the City in court, and paying the NBA — obligations Dundon assumed when he bought the franchise in 2026 (Exclusive Site Agreement §3.3).
1. The City can block it in court (Exclusive Site Agreement §4.2). Through the bridge term — October 2030, team-extendable to 2035 — the non-relocation covenant bars the team from relocating “or seek[ing] to relocate” its home games anywhere but the Moda Center or Memorial Coliseum “without the prior written consent of the City, which may be withheld in the sole and absolute discretion of the City” (§1.3). The covenant is backed by specific performance and injunctive relief (§4.2) — a judge can order the team not to move — the Agreement stipulates that a breach causes the City “irreparable” harm, and the covenant survives even if the operating company defaults (§1.1).
2. The NBA has to say yes (Constitution, Article 7). A move needs a majority vote of the other 29 owners — who denied the last Seattle relocation bid (Kings, 22–8, 2013) once Sacramento produced a local arena deal — plus a relocation fee the Board sets at its discretion, with no public formula. The fee is unbounded, and the Board that sets it doesn't want the move.
During the bridge term, a unilateral move is potentially blockable in court, contractually punitive, league-gated, and economically irrational — he'd forfeit ~$1 billion of public money and the development upside. The moment SB 1501 closes, the long-term non-relocation agreement adds liquidated damages equal to the entire outstanding bond debt (~$365M+).
The contract makes a near-term move legally stoppable and financially ruinous — which is why Dundon says he “hasn't looked anywhere else.” The real relocation leverage sits at the end of the term, absent a new deal. That is a reason to negotiate hard now, not to rush a blank check.
The floor cost is the same wherever he goes. Even a secret, middle-of-the-night move still pays the league's relocation fee, still builds or buys a destination arena, and still resets local revenue from scratch. The Colts, Browns, Braves, and Sonics all left without a public “competition,” and every one still paid to go. You can't predict the destination; you can write the protection. The floor is priced below.
If the owner is the numbers operator he presents as, a billion-plus in unavoidable friction is a cost he won't eat to walk from a fair deal. If he would move regardless of the math, only enforceable lease terms locked in now can constrain him: real damages, specific performance, and recourse to the owner himself (Term 08 & Term 13). Either branch lands in the same place — price it, and put the protection in writing before the money moves.
The City's leverage is concrete; the team's relocation leverage is mostly theoretical.
By late July, the council president was describing the pressure play from inside the building: the team may be trying to “run out the clock” and “wait for the government to give them an excuse and move the team.” “It seems intentional,” Council President Jamie Dunphy told The Athletic on July 27, 2026, after the team declined a work session on how the $120M City share would be spent.
Portland has also beaten this exact threat before — with contracts. Larry Dully, who led the City’s 1991–92 arena negotiation, wrote to the Mayor’s office in March: the City’s negotiator “insisted that we draft all the agreements and let the Blazers react… Later Paul Allen declared the Oregon Arena bankrupt and threatened to move the team. He couldn’t. The agreement was tight. He had personally guaranteed the agreement and could not move the team for 30 years.” And his warning for today: “the threat to leave Portland never ends” (public records production 467663-0002 Verified). The last time Portland faced a bankruptcy-backed relocation threat from this franchise, tight drafting and a personal guarantee — insisted on in advance — defeated it.
We read the executed closing package in July 2026. Three provisions cut against the case above, and anyone arguing this in public should know them before an opponent raises them.
None of this makes relocation cheap — the contracts, the court, and the league fee all still apply, and the building still belongs to Portland. What it means is narrower and more useful: the protections have an expiry date and a gap, and the next lease is where both get fixed. Term 08 → · The closing package, decoded →
Decline these terms and the public avoids a $1.02–1.11B commitment, keeps the revenue the building already earns, and retains the option Seattle used — bidding the arena out to an operator who pays. See the full opportunity-cost ledger →
A no vote on undisclosed or below-market terms is a vote to keep negotiating.
The surest protection is a transparent, market-rate public-return deal with real relocation security written into the lease.
The current lease, NBA process, arena timing, and local political/legal fight make a pre-2030 move the hardest scenario to execute.
If City and County leaders refuse any serious arena and lease framework, the relocation argument gets stronger. Even then it requires a destination, arena terms, NBA approval, and economics that have not been shown.
If Portland offers a transparent deal benchmarked to peer cities, relocation becomes much harder to justify economically or politically.
Portland should not dare the Blazers to leave. It should put a credible market-rate offer on the table, publish the lease and revenue waterfall, and require anyone invoking relocation to identify the actual destination package the NBA would approve.
Portland's 2024 bridge lease is the legal starting point. It gave the City ownership, time, and control so the long-term deal could be negotiated from a stronger position.
Ordinance 191858 authorized Portland to buy the Moda Center arena for $1 and the Kosei parcel beneath part of the arena for $7.13M. Verified The same ordinance says public ownership gives the City "greater control" over the building and makes future public bond financing easier.
| Bridge lease fact | What the 2024 ordinance says | Why it matters now |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose of ownership | The ordinance identifies public ownership as a way to create property-tax benefits, City control, and access to public bond financing. | The same structure gives Council reason to demand lease terms, revenue sharing, and protections before local commitments. |
| Negotiation runway | Keeps the team at Moda Center through at least 2030 while a long-term deal is negotiated. | Local approval is the leverage point the bridge preserved. |
| Capital discipline | During the bridge term, City capital spending is a match, capped by prior-year Blazers game ticket user fees and parking revenues. The ordinance adds: "No City revenues from other sources" will be spent on those capital projects. | If the long-term deal departs from that matched, capped, venue-funded discipline, Council should require a public explanation and a clear General Fund return. |
| Property-tax cost | The City estimated the transfer to public ownership would reduce property taxes collected by about $1.2M per year. | That cost makes rent, PILOT-equivalent value, or revenue participation part of the fair-return question. |
| Operator funds capital & first-class upkeep | The City's bridge-lease summary states Rip City has "full responsibility for… funding and completing Moda Center capital repair, maintenance, and improvement projects and maintaining the arena in a first-class manner." The executed lease (Arena Operating Lease §10.2) makes the "first-class" standard "a continuing obligation" the operator "remains subject to" — and although the City agreed not to enforce it during the bridge term, the duty is tolled and "fully applicable upon termination." | Keeping Moda first-class is already the operator's contractual job. The proposed ~$600M deal — with no operator capital so far — asks the public to fund what the current lease assigns to the team. |
| Repayment if the team leaves | The executed lease is explicit (Arena Operating Lease §10.9.1): "If the Arena ceases to be the NBA home of the Portland Trail Blazers… Tenant shall repay the City Contribution paid to Tenant during the Term." Public capital is protected on the team's exit. | Any long-term deal should carry the same protection — Council should confirm whether the $600M package does. |
The bridge lease sets the principle: public investment tied to public control, disclosed venue revenue, capped exposure, and a real negotiation. Council should apply the same standard to any long-term deal.
A City analysis sent to councilors on June 3, 2026 notes that the City has enforced the "first-class" standard before; that if the team left, the City "potentially may be able to recuperate some of the FCA's deferred maintenance costs," though it has "not identified what categories" those would include; and that a replacement operator "may be willing to contribute to some capital costs in exchange for a long-term operating lease." Each cuts the same way: Portland holds more leverage than the "subsidize or lose the team" framing implies.
At his introductory press conference, Tom Dundon said the Blazers would negotiate a "market deal" and that city and county representatives should negotiate a deal that is "great for them."
That is the shared standard: the final lease should be judged against public market benchmarks before any vote.
Source: Blazer's Edge, April 2, 2026The dispute is the definition of market rate.
Market rate means what comparable NBA cities actually secured when public money was put into an arena: private capital, rent, naming-rights participation, user fees, community benefits, audits, overrun protection, non-relocation terms, lease length, and General Fund return. It lets Council compare the final lease against low, average, and high outcomes from peer-city deals.
Market rate can also be argued from the team's leverage: what competing cities might offer for NBA tenancy. That is a normal negotiating posture, but Council cannot judge a public deal against unnamed cities, undisclosed lease terms, and relocation claims that have not been shown.
City Council should use the public benchmark definition. Ownership negotiates for the team's economics; Portland officials should negotiate just as clearly for the public's.
See the homepage benchmark table: low, average, and high market outcomes →
Losing the Blazers would be bad for Portland and Oregon. The arena anchors real activity in the Central City, and pro-deal materials cite roughly $670 million in annual economic impact, nearly 4,500 jobs, 1.6 million visitors, and 240+ event days. Modeled
That is the strongest case for renovation. It is not a case for approving public financing before the lease is public: economic-impact studies often count gross activity, spending that may have happened elsewhere, and arena revenue that never returns to public services. Council should require a model that separates Blazers-caused activity from non-Blazers activity, new Oregon dollars from shifted local spending, and Arena Fund recycling from General Fund return.
Public ownership tells us who holds title. It does not tell us who captures the cash flows.
Private investors may buy the bonds, but the bonds are repaid from public tax revenues routed through the Oregon Arena Fund.
If renovation makes Moda Center a more valuable income-producing asset, the public should see who receives each major revenue stream.
| Revenue stream | Who gets it under the proposed lease? | Publicly disclosed? |
|---|---|---|
| Base rent / lease payments | Unknown | No |
| Ticket user fees | Partially disclosed under bridge lease | Incomplete |
| Parking revenue | Partially disclosed under bridge lease | Incomplete |
| Naming rights | Unknown | No |
| Sponsorships | Unknown | No |
| Suites / premium seating | Unknown | No |
| Concessions / food and beverage | Unknown | No |
| Merchandise | Unknown | No |
| Venue rental for non-Blazers events | Unknown | No |
| Net operating profit | Unknown | No |
| Non-Blazers concert/event upside | Unknown | No |
| District development upside | Unknown | No |
Before any vote commits city or county money, officials should publish the draft lease and revenue waterfall — what flows to the General Fund, what stays in the Arena Fund, what goes to the team/operator.
The Board of Governors authorized formal exploration of expansion specifically in Seattle and Las Vegas, and the league engaged PJT Partners to evaluate prospective markets, ownership groups, arena infrastructure, and expansion economics. That is not a final award, but these are the two markets the NBA is actively preparing to sell as new franchises.
That makes them very weak relocation threats: a relocation into either city consumes an expansion slot existing owners may otherwise sell. Council should treat both as expansion-reserved markets unless someone shows a proposal that makes owners whole for that expansion-fee upside — not legally impossible, economically unlikely.
Relocation is a league-governed process with approval gates, economic incentives, territorial issues, and a record of how owners have treated cities making good-faith retention efforts.
| League gate | What it means | Why it matters to Portland | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expansion approval | NBA expansion is a separate league action generally understood to require a three-fourths Board vote. | Owners may prefer expansion fees over letting a relocated team consume one of those markets. | High |
| Relocation approval | Relocation requires NBA Board approval and relocation-committee review. | A destination package still has to persuade the league. | High |
| Territorial rights | NBA documents and reporting describe territorial protections around existing franchises. | Expansion teams there would add a league-rights obstacle to future relocation. | Medium |
| Good-faith retention review | Relocation analysis has historically considered whether the current market made serious efforts to retain the team. | Oregon's SB 1501 process and a serious City/County offer strengthen Portland's case that it is not abandoning the franchise. | Medium-high |
Expansion fees are separate from the national media-rights deal and are generally not treated as Basketball Related Income shared with players. If an expansion slot is worth the reported $5 billion to $10 billion, one consumed expansion market represents roughly $167 million to $330 million per existing team split evenly among the 30 owners. Modeled A relocation into Seattle or Las Vegas would need to make existing owners whole for that.
National media revenue generally travels with the franchise. Expansion dilutes each team's annual media share, but the one-time expansion fee can more than offset that dilution over a long horizon. Modeled
The NBA Board can impose a relocation fee; no public formula sets the number. The 2008 Seattle SuperSonics move to Oklahoma City reportedly included a $30 million relocation fee when franchise valuations were far lower than today's. Scaling that precedent is illustrative only, but relocation has league-imposed transaction costs beyond the local lease. Modeled
The league's public posture, its expansion process, and its relocation rules all point the same direction: relocation is a high-friction path, not an automatic fallback if Portland negotiates hard.
Seattle had no building ownership and no covenant. Portland has both — and a buyer who just paid $4.25B for a Portland franchise.
Campaign clip: Wake Up Rip City podcast, July 2026, at 19:38.The expansion markets are spoken for, and the lease and covenant travel with the team.
Campaign clip: Wake Up Rip City podcast, July 2026, at 25:19.Walking away prices out at hundreds of millions: foregone renovation value, bridge-lease obligations, and a franchise bought at a Portland price.
Campaign clip: Wake Up Rip City podcast, July 2026, at 38:26.Silver on the Blazers' Portland history, the Nike relationship, and why the NBA would not want the franchise to leave.
Source clip: NBA Commissioner Adam Silver with Brooke Olzendam, Portland Trail Blazers, March 13, 2026.Silver points to a metro of roughly 2.5 million and says Portland is larger than most American cities.
Source clip: NBA Commissioner Adam Silver with Brooke Olzendam, Portland Trail Blazers, March 13, 2026.| Signal | What happened | What it means for Portland | Source type |
|---|---|---|---|
| League preference on Portland | In July 2025, Adam Silver said it was the league's preference that the Blazers remain in Portland, while also flagging the arena as the challenge. | The NBA is not publicly asking for Portland to be replaced. It is asking for an arena solution. | Reported statement |
| Current relocation posture | At All-Star weekend in February 2026, Silver said relocation was "not on the table right now" while discussing expansion. | Not a permanent legal bar, but a meaningful current league-position signal. | NBA transcript |
| Article 7 factors | The NBA Constitution directs relocation review to consider existing-market support, media markets, arena terms, commercial relationships, proposed-market viability, and interest in expansion. | Portland's media market, fan support, arena ownership, and public process are all relevant under the league's own framework. | Governing document |
The NBA's current posture gives Portland more negotiating room than officials are acting like.
Even after 2030, relocation still depends on NBA approval, possible relocation fees, destination arena economics, local revenue reset, market size, expansion-market opportunity cost, and the value of staying in a renovated Moda Center.
No one has publicly identified a destination package that is clearly superior to Portland plus a publicly renovated Moda Center. A credible threat should name the city, arena control, public subsidy, lease economics, NBA approval path, relocation-fee treatment, local media upside, and 2030-ready timeline — on the record.
Seattle and Las Vegas are attractive markets; a relocation into either would have to overcome the league's expansion process and the expansion-fee windfall for existing owners. The other floated cities show no superior public package: Raleigh-Durham is a comparable U.S. television market; Austin, Nashville, San Diego, Kansas City, and Las Vegas are smaller than Portland; Vancouver and Mexico City raise cross-border questions that do not fit a 2030 timeline. Modeled
| Market | DMA rank | TV households | What is publicly known | Why it is not proof of a superior package | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Portland | #23 | ~1.28M | Existing NBA market with Moda Center and public renovation pathway. | This is the baseline a relocation package would have to beat. | Current market |
| Seattle | #13 | ~2.1M | NBA-scale arena infrastructure and strong basketball history. | The league is formally exploring Seattle for expansion. A relocation would consume the NBA's clearest expansion prize. | Expansion conflict |
| Las Vegas | #40 | ~0.90M | Major-league sports growth market with arena infrastructure. | The league is formally exploring Las Vegas for expansion. Relocation would have to explain why owners should give up a clean expansion-fee sale. | Expansion conflict |
| Austin | #34 | ~1.03M | Fast-growing Texas market with Moody Center. | Smaller TV market than Portland, close to the Spurs' market, with no public NBA arena-control or subsidy package. | Unproven package |
| Raleigh-Durham | #22 | ~1.35M | Comparable TV market with a renovated NHL arena and ownership's Hurricanes ties. | More plausible than most, but no public NBA relocation package, lease economics, territory analysis, or approval path has been disclosed. | Ownership connection / unproven |
| Nashville | #26 | ~1.20M | Growing market with an NHL arena. | Smaller TV market than Portland; no public record of an NBA-ready arena-control package. | Unproven package |
| San Diego | #30 | ~1.12M | Large California market with recurring arena discussions. | Smaller TV market than Portland; no completed NBA arena package; Southern California territorial issues would need analysis. | Unproven package |
| Kansas City | #33 | ~1.03M | Existing downtown arena and major-event experience. | Roughly 20% smaller TV market than Portland and no disclosed NBA lease/subsidy package superior to staying. | Unproven package |
| Vancouver, B.C. | n/a | Canadian market | Former NBA market with Rogers Arena. | No public NBA ownership or relocation package has been shown; cross-border currency, tax, media, and operations issues are hard to reconcile with 2030. | Cross-border / unproven |
| Mexico City | n/a | Global market | Huge market with NBA regular-season history and Arena CDMX scale. | A serious long-term league market, but travel, operations, and player-relations issues remain publicly unresolved; not a credible 2030 pressure point. | Long-term / speculative |
Raleigh is the most plausible ownership-linked alternative, and no one has shown the NBA package. Deal proponents should identify a real alternative before asking Portlanders to accept an unnamed relocation threat as a reason to approve weak terms.
A relocation has to beat what staying already offers: a publicly owned NBA arena, a confirmed $365M state-backed renovation path, an existing fan base and sponsors, and a league process pointed toward Seattle and Las Vegas expansion.
The table below is an illustrative full-friction relocation scenario, not a claim that every cost applies in every case; the exact number depends on timing and destination. Modeled
| Cost category | Low estimate | High estimate | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| NBA relocation fee | $250M | $2B+ | Model estimate; Board discretion and expansion-market economics. |
| Legal fees / relocation process after 2030 | $5M | $25M+ | Litigation, NBA process, and public-affairs spend after lease expiry; excludes damages or settlements. |
| Settlement, damages, or delay exposure | $0 | $500M+ | Depends on the new lease, clawbacks, non-relocation terms, injunction risk, and whether public investment has been made. |
| Destination arena package | $500M | $2B | Comparable arena cost range; depends on public/private terms. |
| Local revenue reset | $100M | $200M | Model assumption for sponsorships, suites, ticketing, and local media reset. |
| Smaller-market or weaker-package risk | $250M | $650M | Model assumption if destination economics are weaker than Portland. |
| Forfeited state-backed renovation opportunity | $365M | $365M+ | Confirmed state bond authority under SB 1501; full value depends on city/county participation and final lease/revenue waterfall. |
| Total illustrative range | ~$1.47B | ~$5.74B+ | Illustrative full-friction scenario only. |
That does not mean Portland should accept weak terms. It means the City should negotiate from the reality that a market-rate Portland deal is cheaper, faster, and more certain than any disclosed relocation path.
A serious negotiation models both downsides: losing the Blazers has real public cost, and relocation has real ownership cost.
| Exposure | Known amount / range | How to read it | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rose Quarter / Moda activity | $600M-$670M/yr; 4,500 jobs; 1.6M visitors; 240+ event days | Council should require the underlying methodology and separate gross activity from net General Fund return. | Pro-deal estimate |
| NBA home dates | 41 regular-season games + playoffs | The Blazers are the anchor tenant, but not all 240+ event days; the model should separate Blazers-caused activity from other events. | Public record / schedule |
| Athlete and team income-tax stream | Unknown annual amount | Nonresident athlete taxes, player/team payroll, and district income taxes routed through the Arena Fund; the public needs the forecast before voting. | Requires disclosure |
| Public arena value | ~$7M acquisition; $365M state-backed renovation path | Council needs an independent valuation of Moda Center with and without an NBA anchor tenant. | Public record + unknown |
| Central City activity and nearby property effects | Not publicly isolated | Losing the NBA anchor would hurt nearby activity; the size of that loss should be modeled, not assumed. | Requires disclosure |
| Public-service opportunity cost | $365M state bond authority + local/county commitments | If tax revenue is committed to the arena, officials must show what returns to the General Fund, not only what recycles through the Arena Fund. | Confirmed + requires model |
Most are priced line by line in the cost table above: the relocation fee, destination arena package, local revenue reset, legal exposure, and the forfeited $365M state-backed path. Add two more: the expansion-fee opportunity cost of $167M–$330M per owner, and the $339M–$361M in annual team revenue at risk, of which only national league money travels automatically. Modeled
Portland should model the cost of losing the Blazers, then use ownership's relocation cost to negotiate enforceable public return.
No. A team can leave if ownership, the league, and a destination market all align — but leaving beats staying only with a named city, a financed arena, an NBA approval path, a league-set relocation fee, and economics that beat a $365M state-backed renovation.
Nobody has publicly shown that package, so the burden of proof sits with the threat: name the city, the arena, and the votes. Until someone with actual authority does, relocation is a negotiating posture. The destination-by-destination reality check →
The commissioner's own answer points the other way. In Portland, Silver emphasized the franchise's long history, the league's relationship with Nike, and why the NBA would not want the Blazers to leave — the clip is embedded in the league-posture section above.
No. Asked whether Portland is small, Silver pointed to a metro area of roughly 2.5 million people and said Portland is larger than most American cities. That undercuts the idea that Portland is a marginal market with no choice but to accept weak terms.
2030 is the start of the conversation, not the end of it. Four things the “they'll walk” framing skips:
The “sign now or lose them” pressure runs backwards. The team is legally parked at Moda through 2030 while the deal asks the public to fund a ~$1 billion renovation and let the operator keep the new revenue — naming, premium, parking — for $1 a year (the streams →). Because the team can't relocate without the City's consent, the City can hold out for a market return. The deadline pressure sits with the side that needs a new deal — and that isn't Portland.
The NBA itself took those cities off the relocation board. On March 25, 2026, the Board of Governors voted to formally explore expansion in Seattle and Las Vegas. Expansion seats reportedly run $5–10 billion, paid to the existing owners — a relocation into either city consumes a market the other 29 owners can otherwise sell. And the last attempt to move a team to Seattle (the Kings, 2013) was denied 22–8 once Sacramento stepped up with a local arena deal.
Not legally impossible — just economically backwards for the people who'd have to vote yes. How relocation actually works →
Run the list. Austin, Nashville, Kansas City, and San Diego are not TV-market upgrades over Portland. Raleigh is the Dundon-adjacent name — but it's an unproven NBA market whose arena just completed a $300M NHL-driven public renovation. Vancouver and Mexico City are long-term league concepts, not 2030-ready destinations. And every candidate would have to out-bid what Portland already has: a publicly owned NBA arena with a $365M state-backed renovation path. The market-by-market check →
Our full-friction estimate runs $1.47B–$5.74B+ before a move makes economic sense: a league-set relocation fee (the NFL charged the Raiders $378M), a destination arena package, settlement and legal exposure, local revenue reset, and walking away from the $365M state-backed path. Under the NBA Constitution (Article 7), it also takes a majority of the other 29 owners — who said no, 22–8, last time. Every assumption is shown. The line items →
Seattle's lesson is the lease, not the subsidy. The group that bought the Sonics in 2006 intended to move all along — the owners' own emails proved it. What protected Seattle's taxpayers was its binding KeyArena lease: the city enforced it and collected ~$45M on the way out.
That's why this campaign's ask is enforceable lease terms — a relocation penalty keyed to the full public stack, guaranteed by the team entity and ownership, not just the operator shell. The statutory floor (SB 1501 §6(1)(d)) covers only outstanding bond debt and binds only the operator — and the statute itself calls that a minimum. The penalty, drafted → · The full Sonics story →
We read both laws. Neither contains a December deadline. SB 1501 has no date at all; SB 5701 — the actual bond authorization — runs the first $200M through June 30, 2027 (§4), and the remaining $165M is already enacted law for the biennium starting July 1, 2027 (§6). What mid-December protects is a bond-sale calendar slot; if it slips, lawmakers can pass — in OPB's own words — “an identical bill” in the session that convenes in mid-January.
Meanwhile: the team holds the contractual right to play every home game at Memorial Coliseum, fee-free (ESA §1.2.3), and Council's own president says “we're not going to be held hostage.” A good deal in February beats a bad deal in December. The deadline, fact-checked →
No — the opposite. Renovate Moda. Keep the Blazers. Make a deal, not a donation. We support the renovation on terms where the public that pays ~$1 billion gets a transparent, enforceable, market-rate return — the same terms this ownership already signed in Raleigh. The Fair-Deal Term Sheet →
The peer-city benchmark — not an unnamed relocation auction. Tom Dundon's own words set the standard: “we're gonna negotiate and do a market deal.” Market, measured: ownership paid 18–62% of capital in every verified peer renovation (Cleveland, D.C., Atlanta, Indianapolis); this same owner pays $4.5M→$5.5M/yr rent in Raleigh with district development on the county tax rolls and 10% affordable housing. Council should benchmark the final lease against those numbers, in public, before any vote. The benchmark table →
Because public ownership is not public cash flow. The Dundon-owned operator runs the building and keeps the revenue from every event — the 2024 lease even routes the City's own ticket user fees and parking revenue back to the operator as the “City Contribution” (§10.9). The public owns the asset; the operator harvests it. Who keeps the revenue →
No. The bonds are repaid with diverted tax money. SB 1501 redirects Rose Quarter income-tax withholding — including the Blazers' own payroll — out of the General Fund and into the Arena Fund: the state's own Legislative Revenue Office books it at −$72.3M, then −$82.6M per biennium from the budget that funds schools and services. The full money trail →
This analysis uses public records and comparable arena data. Several key documents have not been released, including the full lease draft, revenue waterfall, independent arena valuation, General Fund ROI model, maintenance reserve schedule, and cost-overrun allocation. Where data is missing, this page identifies what officials should disclose before voting.
Caveat: Expansion has not been formally awarded.
We support keeping the Blazers in Portland and renovating Moda Center. But relocation should not be used as a reason to approve public financing before the public sees the lease, revenue waterfall, cost-overrun protections, relocation terms, and General Fund return.
Email City Council now →Analysis based on public records, NBA expansion reporting, legislative filings, and comparable arena data.