For three decades the public has owned the land under the Moda Center — and since 2024, the building itself. The arena was financed privately and the revenue flowed to the team. Now Portland is asked for $600M more. Here is the record: what the public put in, what it got back, and how we got here.
The case for the $600M ask usually starts here: Allen funded the arena himself and gave the city a great deal — now it's the public's turn. Every part of that is wrong. The public put in cash, land, and risk from the start — and for all of it, came away with a sliver while the owner captured the revenue and a franchise that grew into the billions.
“Allen paid for the arena himself.” Of the ~$262M build, only ~$46M was Allen's own equity. The rest was lenders' money (~$155M in notes + a ~$16M bank loan), interest, and ~$34.5M from the City — all on public land the City still owns.
“The public took no risk.” When Allen's company filed bankruptcy in 2004, the public's land and venue revenue rode on the outcome — and in 2024 the City bought the building and took on its upkeep.
“Allen gave the city a fortune.” The City's return was a 6% ticket fee recycled into a venue fund — not the profits. To the General Fund (police, parks, housing): about $0.
Sourced and verified unless tagged Est (our estimate) or Proj (projection) — method in the notes. We never show an estimate as a fact.
| The public | Allen → the owner | |
|---|---|---|
| Cash in | ~$42M$34.5M to build + $7.1M to buy the arena (2024) | ~$116M$46M arena equity + $70M for the team (1988) |
| Risk & assets | The land (kept), two garages, the plaza — and rode out the 2004 bankruptcy | ~$171M of arena debt — shed onto the lenders in 2004 |
| Revenue 1995–2026 | ~$150M ticket feerecycled to a venue fund — to the General Fund: $0 | ~$4–5BEst gross~$71M operating profit in 2023-24 alone |
| Ending asset | An aging building — plus a $600M bill | Sold the franchise for ~$4.25B |
| Bottom line | Net to taxpayers: roughly nothing — less, with $600M. | $70M → $4.25B: a ~$4.18B gain, plus decades of revenue. |
Verified / reported: the $70M 1988 purchase & ~$4.25B 2026 sale (ESPN, Sportico); the ~$262M build split (~$46M equity, ~$155M notes, ~$16M bank loan, ~$34.5M City) from the Spokesman-Review (1995); 2023-24 revenue ~$339M and operating profit ~$71M (Forbes/CNBC); the 2024 purchase from Ordinance 191858; the ~$150M fee is the City's reported figure. Est the ~$4–5B gross revenue is our estimate: ~30 seasons at Forbes-tracked revenue rising from ~$100M to ~$339M/yr (a ~$150M/yr average × ~30 yrs ≈ ~$4.5B). Exact profits aren't public — which is itself the point.
The franchise grew ~60× in 38 years — about 11.4%/year. Apply far more conservative rates to Tom Dundon's ~$4.25B purchase and the gains still dwarf what the public is being asked to add now.
| Annual growth | Value in 2056 | 30-year gain |
|---|---|---|
| Conservative · 5%/yr | ~$18.4B | ~$14B |
| Moderate · 7%/yr | ~$32B | ~$28B |
| Historical · ~11.4%/yr | ~$109B | ~$104B |
Proj Illustrative, not a forecast — here's the math. Each value compounds the 2026 price for 30 years: $4.25B × (1 + r)30 at r = 5%, 7%, and the historical ~11.4%/yr — the rate that turns $70M (1988) into $4.25B (2026): (4.25B ÷ 70M)1/38 − 1. The gain subtracts the $4.25B price. National TV: the NBA's $76B, 11-year deal (2025-26 on) = $6.9B/yr ÷ 30 teams ≈ $230M/team (ESPN). Growth isn't guaranteed and reflects the whole NBA, not the arena alone.
Leaked NBA financials showed the Nets' claimed $100M+ in losses were closer to $24M.
The Clippers stayed profitable while their owner reported $700M in mostly paper losses — via a 1959 tax rule that writes players off like equipment.
All 30 teams together netted $530M+ in 2016–17 — and no NBA team has ever sold for less than it cost.
If the model were truly broken, the fix is simple: open the books. Owners never do — the same reason the public shouldn't commit $600M to a deal whose venue revenue and terms still aren't public.
Nets & Clippers paper losses: ProPublica, “The Billionaire Playbook”. League-wide 2016–17 net income: ESPN.
Every entry below is sourced. Teal markers are moments the public's ownership stake grew; red markers are the private deals layered on top.
On June 23, 1993, the City and Paul Allen's Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) sign the foundational agreements:
2024 Exclusive Site Agreement, Recitals C–D (efiles 16988077); Ordinance 191857, Finding 5.
The arena opens October 12, 1995 — the deal in three lines:
portland.gov/venues/moda-center; Moda Center (Wikipedia), citing contemporaneous Oregonian coverage.
For nearly three decades the split holds:
Rose Garden Report; portland.gov/venues/moda-center. Naming-rights and user-fee totals are reported figures; the contracts are records-request targets.
The arena was built and run through a shell company — the Oregon Arena Corporation, wholly owned by Paul Allen, who in 1993 had declined to personally guarantee the $155M construction loan (the reason lenders demanded 8.99% with no prepayment). On February 27, 2004, OAC filed Chapter 11, claiming a soft economy had pushed revenue below its debt service. Talks collapsed — Allen offered ~$90M; creditors wanted ~$198M — and that November the court handed the arena to the lenders. In fairness, Allen's camp argued the debt genuinely outran revenue, and that lenders had already collected ~$195M on the $155M loan, plus the building.
Rose Garden arena bankruptcy (Wikipedia), citing The Oregonian (Helen Jung) and the Portland Tribune (Dwight Jaynes); CC&R Assignment recorded Jan 11, 2005.
Under creditor ownership, the Blazers — still Allen's — almost immediately demanded about $40M in renovations from PAM to keep the Rose Garden “first-class.” Allen's camp called the team's lease the “worst in pro sports” and said the “economic model” was broken — fueling speculation he might move the team to Seattle. In 2006 Allen and PAM jointly put the team and arena up for sale (bids reached ~$300–325M); Allen then pulled the team back and repurchased the arena on April 2, 2007 (terms undisclosed). PAM was later renamed Rip City Management LLC, the operator that still holds the lease today.
Rose Garden arena bankruptcy (Wikipedia) (the ~$40M demand and 2006 sale process, via The Oregonian); entity history in 2024 Ordinance 191857 exhibits.
With the lease near expiry, the City and team strike a bridge. On Aug 7, 2024, Council passes Ordinances 191857 & 191858 (5–0):
Executed Arena Operating Lease (efiles 16988076); Ord. 191857 & 191858; Bridge Lease Summary.
The 1995 Arena Ground Lease reaches the end of its term on October 11, 2025 and is terminated as part of the 2024 transaction. From here, the City-owned building is governed by the 2024 bridge lease.
Ordinance 191857, Finding 16; Restated Parking Agreement recital (Exhibit F).
The NBA Board of Governors approves the sale on March 30, 2026; control passes April 1, 2026 to a group led by Tom Dundon (“Rip City Rising”) at roughly a $4 billion valuation, about $4.25B all-in. The buyers acquire the team and the operator, Rip City Management — so the bridge-lease obligations, including the capital cap and the repayment-on-exit clause, carry over to the new owners.
Governor Kotek signs SB 1501 on April 27, 2026, creating the Oregon Arena Fund and authorizing up to $365M in state support — contingent on a new 20-year lease and a set of statutory preconditions, including local funding commitments.
OPB on SB 1501; SB 1501 enrolled text (Oregon Legislature).
The proposed renovation totals about $600M — stacked across three governments, with the operator at zero:
The Oregonian conservatively estimates the public cost could top $880M; counting the full interest on the state bonds, the all-in 20-year commitment reaches $1.02B–$1.11B.
Mayor Wilson's “Moda Future” page; SB 1501; the Oregonian (6/3/26). The County ~$88M is a reported/expected figure, not yet adopted.
The 2024 lease is public. The original 1990s contracts, the money figures inside them, and the bankruptcy-era records are not. Before the public commits $600M, these belong on the table — each item below is a specific records request we're pursuing.
The full executed text, including the ground-rent schedule and the original “first-class” maintenance clause. Only referenced — never posted — in the online 2024 documents.
The Entertainment Complex Ground Lease (June 23, 1993) and its 2008/2010 amendments, to establish the rent the operator pays the City for the commercial building on public land. (Only the 2024 Amendment No. 3 is online, and it doesn't restate the dollar figure.)
The original Coliseum Operating Agreement (April 23, 1993) and its first eight amendments, and the original Public Parking Facilities Management Agreement — for the baseline economics of the garages and the Coliseum.
The 2004 transfer order, the PAM/Global Spectrum operating documents, and the 2007 Allen repurchase terms (never disclosed) — to confirm how the “first-class” dispute resolved and what the public's position was.
The year-by-year 6% user-fee collections and Spectator Venues Fund flows since 1995, plus the annual “City Contribution” accountings owed under the 2024 lease (§10.9) — what the public has actually paid and received.
Any City consents, landlord/lender approvals, or assignment-and-assumption instruments by which the new Dundon-controlled entities formally re-confirmed the lease obligations at the March 2026 closing.
This page is built from primary documents wherever they exist: the executed 2024 Arena Operating Lease and its exhibits (Portland efiles), Ordinances 191857 and 191858, the City's published bridge-lease summary and “Moda Future” page, SB 1501, and contemporaneous reporting from OPB, the Oregonian, and Sportico. Figures from the pre-2005 era rely on secondary sources because the original contracts are not online; those are flagged “as reported” and listed above as records requests. Where a number is a pledge rather than an adopted commitment — notably Multnomah County's reported ~$88M — we say so. We will correct anything the records contradict.
Portland owns the land. Portland owns the building. The next deal should look like it.
The 2024 bridge was no windfall for taxpayers — but it kept the basic protections: public ownership, capped public exposure, operator-funded capital, and money returned if the team leaves. Ask Council to hold that line.