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Rip City, Not Rip Off
Updated context: the September 8 contract review
September 8 contract review. Historical quotations and events below remain attributed to their dates. Our current analysis corrects maintenance valuation, funding totals, naming and parking definitions, guarantees and takeover rights. Read the corrections and current evidence; see the revised 46-entry Register.
The Rose Quarter · 1993–2026

Whose ArenaIs It, Really?

The public has owned the land under the Moda Center since 1993 and the building since 2024; the revenue flowed to the team. Now the draft budgets $573M more of public money. The record, 1993–2026.

A public-private partnership — with the emphasis in the wrong place

The 1993–1995 deal, in one view

What the public put in

  • The land — the City-owned Rose Quarter
  • ~$34.5M toward construction
  • Two public parking garages
  • The Rose Quarter Commons plaza

What Allen's company got

  • ~$227M private financing of the ~$262M build
  • A 30-year ground lease on public land
  • All the operating revenue — tickets, suites, concessions, parking, and later naming rights
The public's only recurring cut: a 6% ticket fee — routed to a City venue fund, not the arena or the team. Public land and risk underneath, private revenue on top: the same shape as today's $600M ask.
The short version

“Paul Allen built it alone” doesn’t survive the records. The public put land, bonds, garages, and tax exemptions into the Rose Quarter for thirty years — then bought the arena itself for $1.

$70M → $4.25B Verified — the public’s original 1993 stake, and what the franchise sold for in 2026.

Every “the owner built it” talking point in this negotiation leans on the version of history this page corrects.

How these numbers fit together
$573MProposed public renovation portion: State $365M, City $120M, County $88M. The adopted negotiating documents still need a reconciled funding plan and complete project budget. Proposal verified
Up to $288.6MContinuing contribution ceilings: City $275M plus County $13.6M. Annual limits and actual-receipt conditions matter; these are not unconditional cash commitments. Proposal verified
$861.6M$573M + $288.6M: combined nominal framework ceilings before financing costs. This is neither a present value nor a binding all-in expenditure. Do not add repayment of the same borrowed principal twice. Calculated
$3.17M + $3MProposed initial annual rent and tax-offset payment. Rent begins at the specified post-renovation commencement and escalates by the lesser of CPI-W or 3%; the tax offset grows 5%. Start dates, recipients and credits still matter. These are not the public’s only receipts. Proposal verified
UnvaluedThe maintenance claim, new commercial rights and operating alternatives require legal, engineering and financial valuation. A lifecycle cost estimate is not a damages award; gross venue revenue is not profit.

Verified describes what a source says, not that a proposed obligation is signed or funded. The reconciled ledger and sources →

01  The myth, and the math

“Paul Allen built it
alone” — he didn't

The case for the $600M ask starts here: Allen funded the arena himself and gave the city a great deal. Every part of that is wrong.

×

“Allen paid for the arena himself.” Of the ~$262M build, only ~$46M was Allen's own equity — the rest was lenders' money and ~$34.5M from the City.

×

“The public took no risk.” When Allen's company filed bankruptcy in 2004, the public's land and venue revenue rode on the outcome — and in 2024 the City bought the building and took on its upkeep.

×

“Allen gave the city a fortune.” The City's return was a 6% ticket fee recycled into a venue fund — not the profits. To the General Fund (police, parks, housing): about $0.

The scoreboard

What each side spent · and came away with

Sourced and verified unless tagged Modeled — method in the notes.

The publicAllen → the owner
Cash in~$42M$34.5M to build + $7.1M to buy the arena (2024)~$116M$46M arena equity + $70M for the team (1988)
Risk & assetsThe land (kept), two garages, the plaza — and rode out the 2004 bankruptcy~$171M of arena debt — shed onto the lenders in 2004
Revenue
1995–2026
~$150M ticket feerecycled to a venue fund — to the General Fund: $0~$4–5B Modeled gross~$71M operating profit in 2023-24 alone
Ending assetAn aging building — plus a $600M billSold the franchise for ~$4.25B
Bottom lineNet to taxpayers: roughly nothing — less, with $600M.$70M → $4.25B: a ~$4.18B gain, plus decades of revenue.
Sources & how we got these numbers

Verified / reported: the $70M 1988 purchase & ~$4.25B 2026 sale (ESPN, Sportico); the ~$262M build split (~$46M equity, ~$155M notes, ~$16M bank loan, ~$34.5M City) from the Spokesman-Review (1995); 2023-24 revenue ~$339M and operating profit ~$71M (Forbes/CNBC); the 2024 purchase from Ordinance 191858; the ~$150M fee is the City's reported figure. Modeled the ~$4–5B gross revenue: ~30 seasons at Forbes-tracked revenue averaging ~$150M/yr. Exact profits aren't public.

02  The next thirty years

Now run the
tape forward

The franchise grew ~60× in 38 years — about 11.4%/year. Apply more conservative rates to Tom Dundon's ~$4.25B purchase and the gains still dwarf the $600M ask.

The 30-year projection: even at 5%/yr, a ~$14B gain ▾

What Dundon stands to gain Modeled

Illustrative · 2026 → 2056
Annual growthValue in 205630-year gain
Conservative · 5%/yr~$18.4B~$14B
Moderate · 7%/yr~$32B~$28B
Historical · ~11.4%/yr~$109B~$104B
The proportion that should stop the room Even in the conservative case the owner's 30-year gain is about $14 billion — the $600M public ask is roughly 4% of it. And that's before revenue: national TV alone now pays every team ~$230M a year.
How the projection is calculated

Modeled  Each value compounds the 2026 price for 30 years: $4.25B × (1 + r)30 at r = 5%, 7%, and the historical ~11.4%/yr — the rate that turns $70M (1988) into $4.25B (2026). The gain subtracts the $4.25B price. National TV: the NBA's $76B, 11-year deal = $6.9B/yr ÷ 30 teams ≈ $230M/team (ESPN). Growth isn't guaranteed and reflects the whole NBA, not the arena alone.

“We lose money”: the owner script, and why the books rarely back it ▾
The owner script “Small market, revenues too small, we lose money” is the script in every city. It rarely survives the books:

Leaked NBA financials showed the Nets' claimed $100M+ in losses were closer to $24M.

The Clippers stayed profitable while their owner reported $700M in mostly paper losses — via a 1959 tax rule that writes players off like equipment.

All 30 teams together netted $530M+ in 2016–17 — and no NBA team has ever sold for less than it cost.

If the model were broken, the fix is simple: open the books. Owners never do.

Sources

Nets & Clippers paper losses: ProPublica, “The Billionaire Playbook”. League-wide 2016–17 net income: ESPN.

03  The full record

Thirty years,
one throughline

Every entry is sourced. Teal marks moments the public's stake grew; red, the private deals layered on top.

1993The deal is signed

The partnership documents are executed

Full entry ▾

On June 23, 1993, the City and Paul Allen's Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) sign the foundational agreements:

  • The Arena Ground Lease — the City keeps the land; OAC builds and runs the arena on it
  • The Entertainment Complex Ground Lease for the adjacent One Center Court office building
  • The project CC&Rs, plus a Coliseum Operating Agreement (April 23) handing the same operator the Veterans Memorial Coliseum
Why it matters The original texts — including the ground-rent figures — were never posted online.
Sources

2024 Exclusive Site Agreement, Recitals C–D (efiles 16988077); Ordinance 191857, Finding 5.

1995Doors open

The Rose Garden opens on public land

Full entry ▾

The arena opens October 12, 1995 — the deal in three lines:

  • ~$262M to build: ~$227M private (notes + Allen's equity), ~$34.5M City
  • 30-year ground lease, running to Oct 11, 2025 (three 10-year options)
  • The 6% ticket user fee starts flowing to the City's Spectator Venues Fund
Why it matters When that lease ran out in 2025, the City's leverage peaked — which shaped the 2024 bridge deal.
Sources

portland.gov/venues/moda-center; Moda Center (Wikipedia), citing contemporaneous Oregonian coverage.

1995
–2024
The run

Private revenue on top, a narrow public cut underneath

Full entry ▾

For nearly three decades the split holds:

  • Operator keeps tickets, concessions, suites, parking upside — and from 2013, the Moda Health naming-rights deal
  • Public gets the 6% user fee (about $150M over the period) plus its share of the garages
  • Nobody gets community-benefit obligations — the lease has none
Sources

Rose Garden Report; portland.gov/venues/moda-center. Naming-rights and user-fee totals are reported figures; the contracts are records-request targets.

2004Bankruptcy as strategy

A billionaire takes the arena into bankruptcy — by design

Full entry ▾

The arena was run through a shell company — the Oregon Arena Corporation, wholly owned by Paul Allen, who had declined to personally guarantee the $155M construction loan (why lenders demanded 8.99% with no prepayment). On February 27, 2004, OAC filed Chapter 11, claiming revenue had fallen below its debt service. Talks collapsed — Allen offered ~$90M; creditors wanted ~$198M — and that November the court handed the arena to the lenders. In fairness, Allen's camp argued the debt genuinely outran revenue — lenders had already collected ~$195M on the $155M loan, plus the building.

Why it matters This was widely read not as insolvency but as leverage — the Oregonian's Helen Jung called it “bankruptcy as a business strategy.” Allen capped his loss at his ~$46M of equity and let lenders absorb the rest. That playbook — declare the model broken, hint at leaving, press for a better deal — is the one to watch in the $600M ask.
Sources

Rose Garden arena bankruptcy (Wikipedia), citing The Oregonian (Helen Jung) and the Portland Tribune (Dwight Jaynes); CC&R Assignment recorded Jan 11, 2005.

2005
–07
The clause & the buy-back

The $40M demand, the Seattle whispers, and the buy-back

Full entry ▾

Under creditor ownership, the Blazers — still Allen's — demanded about $40M in renovations from PAM to keep the Rose Garden “first-class.” Allen's camp called the team's lease the “worst in pro sports” and said the “economic model” was broken — fueling talk of a move to Seattle. In 2006 Allen and PAM put the team and arena up for sale (bids reached ~$300–325M); Allen pulled the team back and repurchased the arena on April 2, 2007 (terms undisclosed). PAM was later renamed Rip City Management LLC, the operator that still holds the lease today.

Why it matters The first-class standard is real and enforceable enough that the team itself wielded it — for ~$40M — against its own creditor. It is the same clause the City now points to as leverage: today's lease keeps it “a continuing obligation” that is “fully applicable upon termination”.
Sources

Rose Garden arena bankruptcy (Wikipedia) (the ~$40M demand and 2006 sale process, via The Oregonian); entity history in 2024 Ordinance 191857 exhibits.

2024The City buys in

Portland buys the building — and writes in real protections

Full entry ▾

With the lease near expiry, Council passes Ordinances 191857 & 191858 on Aug 7, 2024 (5–0):

  • City pays $7.13M for the Kosei land parcel; the purchase agreement allocates “$0.00 for the Arena Improvements” — the building itself came across by quitclaim, and the $1 in the deal ran from the operator to the City to end the old ground lease
  • New Arena Operating Lease: $1/yr rent — the same $1 the 1993 lease charged — running to 2030 (option to 2035)
  • The operator gives up three ten-year extension options that could have held the ground lease to roughly 2055
  • City capital capped at “no more than fifty percent (50%)” of what the tenant pays (§10.9)
  • If the team leaves, “Tenant shall repay the City Contribution” (§10.9.1)
Why it matters The deal's real value was the guardrails: the public owns the building, the operator funds most capital, the City's share is capped, and public money is repaid if the team leaves. The $573M ask drops every one of those protections. Worth saying plainly: this was a trade, not a gift. Portland got fee title and pulled its reversion forward about twenty years; the operator gave up options running to 2055. What the closing package never contains is any document valuing either side of that exchange — no appraisal, no condition assessment. What the City signed, decoded →
Sources

Executed Arena Operating Lease (efiles 16988076); Ord. 191857 & 191858; Bridge Lease Summary.

2025The clock runs out

The original 30-year ground lease expires

Full entry ▾

The 1995 Arena Ground Lease reaches the end of its term on October 11, 2025 and is terminated as part of the 2024 transaction. From here, the City-owned building is governed by the 2024 bridge lease.

Why it matters The moment the public's 30-year investment matured into outright ownership — the negotiating leverage Council still holds today.
Sources

Ordinance 191857, Finding 16; Restated Parking Agreement recital (Exhibit F).

2026March · the sale

The team sells for about $4.25 billion

Full entry ▾

The NBA Board of Governors approves the sale on March 30, 2026; control passes April 1, 2026 to a group led by Tom Dundon (“Rip City Rising”) at roughly a $4 billion valuation, about $4.25B all-in. The buyers acquire the team and the operator, Rip City Management — so the bridge-lease obligations, including the capital cap and repayment-on-exit clause, carry over.

Why it matters The franchise has never been more valuable, and the entity that signed the lease is now controlled by new billionaire owners — the same moment the public is asked to contribute $600M.
Sources
2026April · the state

Oregon commits up to $365M — conditioned on a 20-year lease

Full entry ▾

Governor Kotek signs SB 1501 on April 27, 2026, creating the Oregon Arena Fund and authorizing up to $365M in state support — contingent on a new 20-year lease and statutory preconditions, including local funding commitments.

Why it matters The state money is the largest single piece of the $600M ask — and by law it cannot flow until the City and County make binding commitments. The local vote is the gate.
Sources

OPB on SB 1501; SB 1501 enrolled text (Oregon Legislature).

2026Now · the ask

2026: from the floated ask to the adopted framework

Full entry ▾

The earlier floated ask was about $600M. The adopted framework describes $573M in public renovation funding, with continuing contributions accounted for separately:

  • State up to $365M (SB 1501)
  • County a reported ~$88M
  • City $120M proposed renovation portion, plus up to $275M in receipt-conditioned continuing contributions; the County also has a separate continuing ceiling.
  • Operator $0 as a base capital line — the July 17 draft assigns the operator overruns and losses, but no base contribution

Earlier reporting and site models used larger estimates of total public cost. Our current ledger separates $573M in proposed renovation funding from up to $288.6M in conditional continuing contributions. Their $861.6M nominal sum excludes financing and is not a binding all-in expenditure. See the corrected ledger and accounting rules →

Why it matters The ask inverts the 2024 bridge: the final allocation must distinguish existing obligations, new investment, public contribution limits and replacement remedies. The assessment is a lifecycle forecast, not a complete transformation price or an established repair debt. Preserve and independently value the existing maintenance obligations.
Sources

Mayor Wilson's “Moda Future” page; SB 1501; the Oregonian (6/3/26). The County ~$88M is a reported/expected figure, not yet adopted.

2026July · the documents week

Nine days, three documents: the comps, the reset, the draft

Comparable deals show feasible mechanisms, with different public shares and indirect benefits. Compare the whole transaction; no universal private-capital or combined return floor is established. Read the updated analysis →

  • Delivered overruns and operating losses assigned to the operator; a non-relocation agreement with specific performance and clawback; an unconditional parent guaranty that binds successors; audit rights in principle
  • Partial a first revenue line — a $3M/yr property-tax offset, escalating 5%, shared with the County and Portland Public Schools
  • Open rent, private capital, a naming share, the parking fix, and the development terms do not yet appear
  • At risk the tolled “first-class” repair claim goes unmentioned while the lease is set to be “amended and restated”
  • The gate the County’s letter sets a floor the draft doesn’t meet — a revenue stream “at a minimum” matching its debt payments (the draft’s offset covers roughly an eighth of it)
  • Comparable deals show feasible mechanisms, with different public shares and indirect benefits. Compare the whole transaction; no universal private-capital or combined return floor is established. Read the updated analysis →
Why it matters The draft converges with the protections the 2024 bridge pioneered. What remains is the economics column: the public’s money is fully priced in the draft; the public’s return, so far, is one line. See the draft scored, term by term →
Sources

City of Portland draft term sheet, July 17, 2026 (14 pp., posted by the City); PFM “State Funding and Governance Comparable Summary” (surfaced July 9); letter of Commissioners Moyer & Brim-Edwards to Chair Vega Pederson, July 16 — all quoted and scored at /city-draft. Statuses reflect the draft as of July 19, 2026 and will be re-scored against the MOU and definitive agreements.

04  What we still don't know

Records we're
requesting

The 2024 lease is public. The original 1990s contracts and the bankruptcy-era records are not. Before the public commits $600M, these belong on the table.

The 6 records we're requesting — and why ▾
Records request

The original Arena Ground Lease (1993/1995)

The full executed text, including the ground-rent schedule and the original “first-class” maintenance clause.

Records request

The One Center Court office lease + Amendments 1–2

The Entertainment Complex Ground Lease (June 23, 1993) and its 2008/2010 amendments, to establish the rent the operator pays the City for the commercial building on public land.

Records request

Coliseum & parking agreements (originals)

The original Coliseum Operating Agreement (April 23, 1993) and its first eight amendments, and the original Public Parking Facilities Management Agreement.

Records request

Bankruptcy-era records (2004–2007)

The 2004 transfer order, the PAM/Global Spectrum operating documents, and the 2007 Allen repurchase terms (never disclosed) — to confirm how the “first-class” dispute resolved.

Records request

User-fee & revenue accountings

The year-by-year 6% user-fee collections and Spectator Venues Fund flows since 1995, plus the annual “City Contribution” accountings owed under the 2024 lease (§10.9).

Records request

The 2026 sale consents

Any City consents or assignment instruments by which the Dundon-controlled entities re-confirmed the lease obligations at the March 2026 closing.

Who to ask The City's spectator-venues program manager (Karl Lisle) and the Office of the City Attorney administer these contracts; the City's PARC office processes public-records requests. We will publish what comes back.
A note on sourcing & method

Built from primary documents wherever they exist: the executed 2024 Arena Operating Lease and exhibits (Portland efiles), Ordinances 191857 and 191858, the City's bridge-lease summary and “Moda Future” page, SB 1501, and reporting from OPB, the Oregonian, and Sportico. Pre-2005 figures rely on secondary sources because the original contracts are not online; those are flagged “as reported” and listed above as records requests. Where a number is a pledge rather than an adopted commitment (the County's reported ~$88M), we say so. We will correct anything the records contradict.

Portland owns the land. Portland owns the building. The next deal should look like it.

The 2024 bridge kept the basic protections — public ownership, capped exposure, operator-funded capital, repayment if the team leaves. Ask Council to hold that line.

SB 1501 legislative archive — how the bill became law, and what it left for Council

This campaign began by tracking the state bill. SB 1501 is now law, but its legislative history still matters because it explains why Council must negotiate the lease in public.

What the amendments changed
  • "Plaza" deleted from the Arena Fund: removed a boundary around what public money can be spent on.
  • "Sports and entertainment district" created: added a legal zone tied to a map drawn by the Blazers' management company.
  • District-wide tax capture: employee income taxes from new Rose Quarter businesses can be redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund.
  • Blazers given right to sue the public authority: the team can seek injunctive relief against the joint authority.
  • Public downgraded from "operator" to "overseer": the amendment weakened public control language over the building.
  • Tax confidentiality overridden: the bill authorizes use of tax information that is normally protected under ORS 314.835.
  • Ownership ambiguity: Section 5(2)(b) creates an escape hatch if the state does not own the arena.
  • Advisory-only negotiator: Section 6(2)(b) says the review does not require any particular term in the final agreement.
The amendment that never got a vote
  • Sen. Pham introduced the -5 amendment, which would have required private capital from ownership and revenue sharing with the General Fund.
  • Those were the provisions that would have changed the economics of the deal for the ownership group.
  • The amendment was acknowledged, but it was never debated and never voted on.
  • Read the -3 amendment text on OLIS →
How the Arena Fund recycles public money
  • The public pays state bond costs, plus City and County commitments, to renovate the arena through redirected public revenue.
  • The renovation increases the value of the surrounding Rose Quarter district.
  • As new businesses open in the district, their employee wage withholdings can be redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund.
  • The Arena Fund then services renovation debt and arena costs, using tax revenue that would otherwise fund public services.
  • The capture continues until the later of lease expiration or all bonds are retired, which is why General Fund return must be explicit in the lease.