Rip City, Not Rip Off · ripcitynotripoff.com/councilor-comps
The City’s term sheet vs. the comps — stream by stream
Prepared July 2026 · draft term sheet of July 17
Every figure sourced at /city-draft & /deals
Every figure sourced at /city-draft & /deals
How to read this: each block is one revenue or protection stream. The red row is Portland’s July 17 draft term sheet (posted at portland.gov). The rows below it are named peer deals — what other councils actually signed. The gold line in each header is the ask the comps justify. Gold-shaded rows are this same ownership’s own signatures (Raleigh, via the Carolina Hurricanes). Where the draft already delivers, it says so — those terms need defending, not negotiating.
1 · Private capital into constructionJustified ask: a named ownership capital line — peers paid 18–62% of renovation cost
| PORTLAND · July 17 draftModa Center renovation | The $573M budget “is the public portion” — State $365M + City $120M + County $88M. Ownership’s base construction line: $0 (it pays overruns and operating losses only) | 0% |
| Cleveland CavaliersRocket Arena reno · 2019 | Ownership paid $115M of $185M — and absorbed the overruns when the 50/50 deal grew | 62% |
| Detroit PistonsLittle Caesars Arena · 2017 | Ownership side $539M of $863M | 60% |
| Milwaukee BucksFiserv Forum build · 2018 | Private $274M of $524M (state 15%, local 33%) | 52% |
| Sacramento KingsGolden 1 Center · 2016 | Private $279M of $534M — and a hard cap put a $57M overrun on the Kings | 52% |
| Minnesota TimberwolvesTarget Center reno · 2017 | Team (Glen Taylor) $58M + operator $5.9M of $140M; city $74M | ~46% |
| Washington Wizards/CapitalsCapital One Arena reno | Monumental $285M of $800M | 36% |
| Atlanta HawksState Farm Arena reno · 2018 | Ownership $50M of $192.5M | 26% |
| Indiana PacersGainbridge reno · 2023 | Private 18% of the ~$400M project (state’s own PFM study) | 18% |
| Seattle KrakenClimate Pledge Arena · 2021 | Operator (OVG) privately financed the entire ~$1.15B rebuild of a city-owned arena — won in a competitive process | 100% |
2 · PILOT / property-tax paymentJustified ask: greatest-of-three — the county’s own formula makes $5.1–9.4M/yr the post-renovation minimum
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | “Property Tax Offset Payment” of $3M/yr, escalating 5%, split City/County/Schools. No completion reset, no formula, no appraisal true-up. (Multnomah’s own construction formula on the $573M renovation: $5.1–9.4M/yr; the arena paid $1.2–1.5M/yr before the exemption) | $3M/yr |
| Carolina Hurricanes — this ownershipLenovo Center, Raleigh | Pays >$3.5M/yr in PILOTs today to the City of Raleigh and Wake County — per the arena authority’s own published facts, on a ~$300M-class building | >$3.5M/yr |
| Sacramento KingsGolden 1 Center | Pay possessory-interest taxes (California’s default) plus lease payments of $6.5M/yr escalating toward $16.7M on the city-owned arena | taxes + rent |
| Golden State WarriorsChase Center, San Francisco | Fully taxed: assessed at $1.7B (~$20M/yr). Even the Warriors’ own appeal valuation ($706M), at Portland’s rate, implies ~$9.7M/yr | ~$20M/yr |
| Philadelphia 76ersMarket East (proposed, 2024) | Negotiated PILOT averaging ~$6M/yr — on a 100% privately financed $1.3B arena | ~$6M/yr |
3 · RentJustified ask: $4.5M/yr escalating 3% — the schedule this ownership signed in Raleigh
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | No rent line appears in the document. The bridge lease is $1/year | $0 |
| Carolina Hurricanes — this ownershipRaleigh · signed 2024 | Rent of $4.5M rising to $5.5M/yr (~$75M over the lease), replacing rent-free status — negotiated by the public side’s own consultant | $4.5–5.5M/yr |
| Oklahoma City ThunderPaycom Center | $58K per game with a 3% annual escalator (~$2.5M+/yr and growing) | ~$2.5M+/yr |
| Cleveland CavaliersRocket Arena | Base rent $2.0M/yr (state’s own PFM study) | $2M/yr |
| Minnesota TimberwolvesTarget Center | Rent $1.6M/yr — as a tenant in a city-owned, third-party-operated arena | $1.6M/yr |
| Orlando MagicKia Center | Base rent $1.0M/yr — plus the city keeps a revenue share (next stream) | $1M/yr + |
4 · Revenue sharing — naming, premium, parkingJustified ask: participation above an audited baseline + keep the 50/50 district-naming split Portland already signed
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | None. Operator keeps “customary naming… rights”; no premium-revenue share; City’s own user-fee and Blazers-parking receipts are committed back into arena capital (Exhibit D, $275M/20yrs) | $0 |
| Orlando MagicKia Center | The city receives a revenue share from naming rights and corporate suite sales — documented in the State of Oregon’s own comparables study | naming + suites |
| Oklahoma City ThunderPaycom Center | Public side shares food, beverage, and venue revenue | venue share |
| Milwaukee BucksFiserv Forum | $2/ticket surcharge on all events (~$60M over 30 yrs; 75% to the district, 25% to the state) — a per-ticket public return that reaches public budgets | $2/ticket |
| Raleigh — this ownershipdistrict naming | Portland’s own signed 2024 Development Agreement (§31.2.4) already gives the City 50/50 on district and project naming — it just has to survive into the new deal | 50/50 signed |
5 · Relocation securityJustified ask: hold what the draft delivers — and peg damages to the full public stack
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | Delivered: a non-relocation agreement with specific performance (“without the necessity of proving actual damages”), liquidated damages, clawback of public money, an unconditional parent guaranty binding successors. Remaining: a damages formula, and the “limited exceptions” to be defined in the MOU | delivered |
| Oklahoma City Thunder | Relocation penalty reported at ~$1B in the deal’s first five years, declining after | ~$1B |
| Indiana PacersGainbridge | Early lease termination payment of ~$750M — in the State of Oregon’s own comparables study | ~$750M |
| Seattle · the cautionary compKeyArena / Sonics, 2008 | The one protection Seattle had was a binding lease — enforced, it produced a ~$45M (up to $75M) settlement. Portland’s draft has far more | enforce it |
6 · Cost overrunsJustified ask: hold the named payer — add an owner-level GMP and the itemized budget (Exhibit A is blank)
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | Delivered: “Anything in excess of the Renovation Budget… is the responsibility of Rip City” — plus post-renovation operating losses, and an anti-value-engineering clause. Remaining: no GMP, and the budget itemization is a blank exhibit the operator will draft | named |
| Cleveland Cavaliers | Ownership absorbed the overruns — its $70M half grew to $115M and the public’s didn’t | absorbed |
| Sacramento Kings | A hard cap put a $57M overrun on the team, not the city | hard cap |
| Atlanta Hawks · Washington (Capital One) | Ownership-side absorption in both renovations | absorbed |
7 · The state’s share of the billJustified ask: a private capital line brings Portland into the peer range
| PORTLAND · July 17 draft | Oregon’s proposed share is ~62% of the renovation ($365M of $573M) — the highest state share in the state’s own comparables study | 62% |
| Memphis GrizzliesFedExForum reno (planned) | State share 42% — the peer maximum | 42% |
| Indiana Pacers | State-linked share 34% | 34% |
| Milwaukee Bucks | State share 15% | 15% |
| Minnesota · Orlando · Cleveland | State share 0% — local money and private money only | 0% |
Two lines councilors should never let anyone blur: construction capital (stream 1) is upfront money that builds the premium spaces — peers made ownership fund 18–62% of it because the operator keeps those spaces’ income. Revenue participation (stream 4) is an ongoing share of what those spaces earn once built — Orlando’s naming-and-suite share is the model. They are different asks with different comps, and conceding one is not conceding the other. Likewise: a labor agreement is not rent, and a 20-year stay commitment is the minimum consideration for a package this size — not a concession.
The one-sentence version for the dais: the July 17 draft already delivers the protections column — overruns on the operator, real relocation security, a parent guaranty — and the City’s negotiators deserve credit for it. What no peer council accepted, and this one is being asked to, is the economics column: zero construction capital, zero rent, zero revenue share, and a tax payment below the county’s own construction formula. Every ask above has a named precedent — and three of them carry this ownership’s own signature.