Rip City, Not Rip Off · ripcitynotripoff.com/councilor-comps
The City’s term sheet vs. the comps, stream by stream
Prepared September 28, 2026 · the August 12 term sheet, as amended
Every figure sourced at /city-draft & /deals
How to read this: each block is one revenue or protection stream. The red row is Portland’s term sheet as adopted August 12 (the July 17 draft as amended on the floor; adopted 8–4 and nonbinding, with binding documents due by December 31 and a Council vote targeted for December 17). The rows below it are named peer deals, what other councils actually signed. The gold line in each header is the ask the comps justify. Gold-shaded rows are this same ownership’s own signatures, in Raleigh via the Carolina Hurricanes and in Portland via the signed 2024 Development Agreement. Where the adopted sheet already proposes a protection, it says so; those terms need holding through the binding documents, not renegotiating.
1 · Private capital into constructionJustified ask: a named ownership capital line. Across the comps the private share runs from zero to 100%
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12Moda Center renovation | The $573M budget “is the public portion”: State $365M + City $120M + County $88M. Ownership’s base construction line: $0 (it takes overruns and post-renovation operating losses only) | 0% |
| Cleveland CavaliersRocket Arena reno · 2019 | Ownership paid $115M of $185M and absorbed the overruns when the 50/50 deal grew | 62% |
| Detroit PistonsLittle Caesars Arena · 2017 | Ownership side $539M of $863M | 60% |
| Milwaukee BucksFiserv Forum build · 2018 | Private $274M of $524M (state 15%, local 33%) | 52% |
| Sacramento KingsGolden 1 Center · 2016 | Private $279M of $534M, and a hard cap put a $57M overrun on the Kings | 52% |
| Minnesota TimberwolvesTarget Center reno · 2017 | Team (Glen Taylor) $58M + operator $5.9M of $140M; city $74M | ~46% |
| Washington Wizards/CapitalsCapital One Arena reno | Monumental $285M of $800M | 36% |
| Atlanta HawksState Farm Arena reno · 2018 | Ownership $50M of $192.5M | 26% |
| Indiana PacersGainbridge reno · 2023 | Private 18% of the ~$400M project (state’s own PFM study) | 18% |
| Charlotte · Memphis · Salt Lake CitySpectrum Center · FedExForum · Delta Center renos | No base private capital: Charlotte overruns only, plus $2M/yr rent and a $1.1M/yr capital fund from 2031; Memphis 100% public via state bonds and local taxes; Salt Lake’s arena 100% public via a district sales tax, beside $4B+ of private district development. PFM’s review includes fully public examples; no single peer share is a rule | 0% |
| Seattle KrakenClimate Pledge Arena · 2021 | Operator (OVG) privately financed the entire ~$1.15B rebuild of a city-owned arena, won in a competitive process | 100% |
2 · PILOT / property-tax paymentJustified ask: greatest-of-three. The county’s own formula puts the post-renovation figure at $5.1–9.4M/yr, at an assumed 50–100% value realization
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | “Property Tax Offset Payment” of $3M/yr, escalating 5%, split City/County/Schools; proposed, not yet paid. No completion reset, no formula, no appraisal true-up. (Multnomah’s own construction formula on the $573M renovation: $5.1–9.4M/yr; the arena paid $1.2–1.5M/yr before the exemption) | $3M/yr |
| Carolina Hurricanes, this ownershipLenovo Center, Raleigh | Pays >$3.5M/yr in PILOTs today to the City of Raleigh and Wake County, per the arena authority’s own published facts, on a ~$300M-class building | >$3.5M/yr |
| Sacramento KingsGolden 1 Center | Pay possessory-interest taxes (California’s default) plus lease payments of $6.5M/yr escalating toward $16.7M on the city-owned arena | taxes + rent |
| Golden State WarriorsChase Center, San Francisco | Fully taxed: assessed at $1.7B (~$20M/yr). Even the Warriors’ own appeal valuation ($706M), at Portland’s rate, implies ~$9.7M/yr | ~$20M/yr |
| Philadelphia 76ersMarket East (proposed, 2024) | Negotiated PILOT averaging ~$6M/yr on a 100% privately financed $1.3B arena | ~$6M/yr |
3 · RentJustified ask: rent priced against the whole package. Raleigh’s $4.5M rising to $5.5M/yr is the comparison, not the template
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | $3.17M/yr, proposed by floor amendment on August 12 where the draft had no rent line at all. It starts only at substantial completion (until then the bridge lease’s $1 a year stands) and escalates at CPI-W or 3%, whichever is less. Not signed, not paid | $3.17M/yr |
| Carolina Hurricanes, this ownershipRaleigh · signed 2024 | Rent of $4.5M rising to $5.5M/yr (~$75M over the lease), replacing rent-free status, negotiated by the public side’s own consultant. Raleigh’s own figure, inside Raleigh’s own package | $4.5–5.5M/yr |
| Oklahoma City ThunderPaycom Center | $58K per game with a 3% annual escalator (~$2.5M+/yr and growing) | ~$2.5M+/yr |
| Cleveland CavaliersRocket Arena | Base rent $2.0M/yr (state’s own PFM study) | $2M/yr |
| Minnesota TimberwolvesTarget Center | Rent $1.6M/yr as a tenant in a city-owned, third-party-operated arena | $1.6M/yr |
| Orlando MagicKia Center | Base rent $1.0M/yr plus the city keeps a revenue share (next stream) | $1M/yr + |
4 · Revenue sharing: naming, premium, parkingJustified ask: participation above an audited baseline, plus a real naming share; the 2024 agreement’s 50% royalty clause is a foothold, not that share
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | None. Operator keeps “customary naming… rights”; no premium-revenue share; the City’s own user-fee and Blazers-parking receipts are committed back into arena capital (Exhibit D, up to $275M over 20 years) | $0 |
| Orlando MagicKia Center | The city receives a revenue share from naming rights and corporate suite sales, documented in the State of Oregon’s own comparables study | naming + suites |
| Oklahoma City ThunderPaycom Center | Public side shares food, beverage and venue revenue | venue share |
| Milwaukee BucksFiserv Forum | $2/ticket surcharge on all events (~$60M over 30 yrs; 75% to the district, 25% to the state), a per-ticket public return that reaches public budgets | $2/ticket |
| Portland, this ownership2024 Development Agreement | Development Agreement §31.2.4 shares specified Project trademark royalties; §31.2.3 separately restricts selling Project naming rights. The 50% royalty clause is not already a general district naming-sponsorship share, and reversion under §31.4 remains subject to prior licensees. A foothold to build on in the new deal, not a share to defend | 50% royalties only |
5 · Relocation securityJustified ask: hold what the sheet proposes, and peg damages to the full public stack
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | Proposed: a non-relocation agreement with specific performance (“without the necessity of proving actual damages”), liquidated damages, clawback of public money, an unconditional parent guaranty binding successors. Remaining: a damages formula, the “limited exceptions” to be defined in the MOU, and signatures | proposed |
| Oklahoma City Thunder | Relocation penalty reported at ~$1B in the deal’s first five years, declining after | ~$1B |
| Indiana PacersGainbridge | Early lease termination payment of ~$750M, in the State of Oregon’s own comparables study | ~$750M |
| Seattle · the cautionary compKeyArena / Sonics, 2008 | The one protection Seattle had was a binding lease. Enforced, it produced a ~$45M (up to $75M) settlement. Portland’s adopted sheet proposes far more; the binding documents have to deliver it | enforce it |
6 · Cost overrunsJustified ask: hold the named payer, and add an owner-level GMP and the itemized budget (Exhibit A is blank)
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | Proposed: “Anything in excess of the Renovation Budget… is the responsibility of Rip City”, plus post-renovation operating losses and an anti-value-engineering clause. Remaining: no GMP, and the budget itemization is a blank exhibit the operator will draft | named, proposed |
| Cleveland Cavaliers | Ownership absorbed the overruns: its $70M half grew to $115M and the public’s did not | absorbed |
| Sacramento Kings | A hard cap put a $57M overrun on the team, not the city | hard cap |
| Atlanta Hawks · Washington (Capital One) | Ownership-side absorption in both renovations | absorbed |
7 · The state’s share of the billJustified ask: a private capital line brings Portland into the peer range
| PORTLAND · adopted Aug 12 | Oregon’s proposed share is ~64% of the renovation budget ($365M of $573M), the highest state share in the state’s own comparables study | 64% |
| Memphis GrizzliesFedExForum reno (planned) | State share 42%, the peer maximum | 42% |
| Indiana Pacers | State-linked share 34% | 34% |
| Milwaukee Bucks | State share 15% | 15% |
| Minnesota · Orlando · Cleveland | State share 0%: local money and private money only | 0% |
Two lines councilors should never let anyone blur: construction capital (stream 1) is upfront money that builds the premium spaces. Most renovation peers made ownership fund part of it, from Indiana’s 18% to Cleveland’s 62%, and Seattle’s operator funded all of it, because the operator keeps those spaces’ income; a few peers funded it publicly, which is why the ask is a named line, not a fixed percentage. Revenue participation (stream 4) is an ongoing share of what those spaces earn once built; Orlando’s naming-and-suite share is the model. They are different asks with different comps, and conceding one is not conceding the other. Likewise: a labor agreement is not rent, and a 20-year stay commitment is the minimum consideration for a package this size, not a concession.
The one-sentence version for the dais: the term sheet adopted August 12 proposes the protections column (overruns on the operator, real relocation security, a parent guaranty), and councilors added rent on the floor where the draft had a dollar. The City’s negotiators and that floor amendment deserve the credit. What remains open in the economics column, and what the binding documents due December 31 still have to answer, is this: no required construction capital, no revenue share, rent below the Raleigh comparison, and a tax payment below the county’s own construction formula. Every ask above has a named precedent; two of them carry this ownership’s own Raleigh signature, and a third has a foothold in its own 2024 Portland agreement.