Oregon is handing a billionaire $1 billion+ to renovate an arena the public already owns. The owner pays nothing. No rent. No revenue sharing. No private capital.
This isn't normal
16 NBA arena deals in the last decade. Average private share: 43%. Portland: 0%. Even OKC, which funded 94% publicly, got $58K/game rent and a $1B relocation penalty. Portland got nothing. See all deals
No transparency
The Mayor coordinated directly with the Blazers' consultant before City Council voted. The Blazers' negotiator — who previously secured rent, PILOTs, and housing protections for the public in Raleigh — switched sides. Portland has no independent negotiator.
Breaking — March 16, 2026
The relocation threat was always a bluff.
The NBA will vote March 24–25 to add expansion teams exclusively in Las Vegas and Seattle, with bids projected at $7–10 billion each. This eliminates the two cities lawmakers cited as relocation threats throughout the SB 1501 debate.
For months, legislators told Oregonians that if Portland didn't hand over $1 billion with no conditions, Seattle or Las Vegas would "steal" the Blazers. Now both cities are getting their own teams. The question is no longer whether the threat was real. It's whether lawmakers were grossly incompetent — or deliberately lying to the public to rush through a deal with no protections.
Full cost analysis: NBA expansion fees alone net each owner $467–667 million — making relocation economically irrational. No remaining destination city has an NBA-ready arena or committed public financing. Even if City Council demands $150M in private capital, staying is 12–40x cheaper than leaving.
Average private share across all other deals: 43%. Portland: 0%. Even the cities with the highest public funding secured rent, revenue sharing, and relocation penalties. Portland got none.
The city purchased the arena from the Paul Allen estate for $1 in 2024. Every lease term, naming right, and revenue participation in this proposal flows from this ownership. The city is not asking for a gift. It is setting the terms under which a private operator uses a public building.
A familiar playbook
This is Dundon's playbook. In Raleigh, he got $300M public for the arena, then built $800M in private development around it. The public hired Dan Barrett of CAA Icon to negotiate — and got $4.5M/yr rent, PILOTs, 10% affordable housing. Now Barrett represents the Blazers in Portland. The public has no equivalent negotiator.
Element
Raleigh (2023)
Portland (2026)
Public arena $
$300M
$600M
Private arena $
$0
$0
Owner / Negotiator
Barrett represented public (Centennial Authority)
Barrett represents Blazers; no public negotiator
Rent to public
$4.5-5.5M/yr
$0
Revenue sharing
Ground lease at 6% FMV
None
PILOTs
Yes
None
Affordable housing
10% required
None
Total public debt service
$300M
$531-$623M (state bonds only)
District tax capture
Limited
All employee withholdings, scaling
The result of this pattern is now quantifiable. On March 5, 2026, Sportico reported that Dundon sold a 12.5% minority stake in the Hurricanes at a $2.66 billion valuation — up from his $420 million purchase price in 2018. That is a 6.3x return in seven years. The $300 million in public arena funding from Raleigh helped drive that appreciation. Dundon captured 100% of the gain. The public got zero. Portland is being asked to repeat this at double the public investment.
Source: Sportico, March 5, 2026; confirmed by ESPN, WRAL, KGW.
Correction (March 1, 2026): An earlier version of this analysis described Dan Barrett of CAA Icon as representing Tom Dundon in the Raleigh arena deal. Barrett was in fact retained by the Centennial Authority, the public body that owns PNC Arena, to represent the public side. He is now representing the Blazers in Portland. We regret the error.
Six asks. Zero in the bill.
Portland owns the Moda Center. Some of these protections — rent, naming rights, PILOTs — are owed to the city as a building owner regardless of who pays for the renovation. The rest are the return on a billion-dollar public investment. Every one has precedent in deals CAA Icon has structured for other cities.
SB 1501 is a framework, not a completed deal. The terms are set in the joint authority agreement — which requires Portland's vote. The bill gave the process a framework. This council gives it terms.
01
$150M private capital contribution
In the bill: Nothing. Zero private capital required.
Portland is the only deal in 16 verified comparables where the private side contributes zero. $150M represents ~17% of project cost — below every comparable except Memphis.
02
$2.5M/year rent to the general fund
In the bill: Nothing. No rent. No revenue sharing. All revenue flows to the Arena Fund — circular subsidization, not public benefit.
Portland owns the building. It is the landlord. No commercial landlord invests $1B+ without charging rent. CAA Icon secured rent in every deal it negotiated for the public — but not in Portland, where it represents the Blazers.
03
50/50 naming rights split to the general fund
In the bill: Nothing. No provision on naming rights. The management entity could capture 100% of future naming rights from a building the public paid to renovate.
Sacramento: City keeps 100% ($6M/yr = $210M over 35 yrs)
A renovated arena in Portland's market commands $8–12M/yr. A 50/50 split yields $4–6M annually. This costs Dundon nothing today — no naming rights deal exists yet. This is Portland's strongest remaining card. Resistance to this ask is evidence of intent to capture revenue from a public building.
04
$1B relocation penalty on total investment, not just bond debt
In the bill: Weaker than advertised. Penalty covers outstanding bond debt only — not the city's $400M+ or county's $88M. As bonds are paid down, penalty approaches zero. A team could time relocation to minimize liability.
The agreement must include a mandatory nonrelocation agreement — not merely authorize remedies if one happens to exist. Penalty calculated on total public investment, $1B in years 1–5, declining ratably over 25 years, secured by letter of credit.
05
30-year lease minimum, not 20
In the bill: 20-year minimum — the shortest lease of any deal in the dataset, on the largest proportional public investment.
20 years means Dundon could walk in 2047 — precisely when the public finishes paying. The bill sets a floor. The council can condition its participation on a higher standard.
06
$3–4.5M/year in PILOT payments
In the bill: Nothing. Under public ownership, the arena is exempt from property tax. Dundon collects all revenue from a tax-exempt property — tickets, suites, concessions, naming rights, events.
Sacramento: Kings pay PILOT (same ownership structure)NYC: Yankee Stadium $84M/yr, Citi Field $44M/yr, Barclays $39M/yrRaleigh: PNC Arena $3.5M/yr ($43.5M since 2000)
Closer to home: the Centennial Authority — the public body that owns PNC Arena in Raleigh — reports that the arena pays more than $3.5 million per year in combined PILOT payments to the City of Raleigh and Wake County. That is $43.5 million total since 2000. Same owner. Same deal structure. PILOTs already in place. (Source: centennialauthority.com)
Post-renovation assessed value: $400–600M. At 50% of theoretical tax liability, a PILOT generates $3–4.5M/yr — totaling $90–135M over 30 years. This is not an extraction. It is compensation for a concrete tax consequence of the structure the bill creates.
If Portland participates without conditions, the negotiator has no mandate.
Section 6(2)(b) explicitly states nothing requires any particular term. The negotiator's mandate is shaped entirely by what the joint authority — including Portland — instructs. Every one of these asks has been implemented in deals Dan Barrett's own firm has structured for other cities.
Act now
SB 1501 is now law. The Legislature passed it without requiring rent, private capital, or revenue sharing. Portland City Council is the last stop. The Council must negotiate the terms before handing over the money. Portland owns the Moda Center — that ownership is leverage, but only if the Council uses it. If they sign without negotiating rent, a private capital match, naming rights revenue, and PILOT payments, the leverage is gone forever. Email all 12 Portland City Councilors and Mayor Wilson now.
You can also submit testimony via OLIS
Submit official written testimony through the Oregon Legislative Information System. Your testimony becomes part of the permanent legislative record on SB 1501.
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Why this deal pays for itself
The Public Investment Return Agreement generates $6.7-10.2 million per year from revenue participation, naming rights, and PILOT payments — directed to the General Fund, not the Arena Fund. That does not include the franchise appreciation right, which delivers $150-400 million when the team sells.
Under the current proposal, the city subsidizes a private business with $600 million and captures nothing. Under the PIRA, the city finances the renovation of a building it owns and collects rent, naming rights, tax equivalency, and appreciation — exactly what any landlord or investor would demand.
Why Dundon will accept
Dundon needs this renovation. Franchise value depends on a modern arena, and the Moda Center is 30 years old. Without it, the asset he paid $4.25 billion for depreciates. His alternatives are all worse: self-funding $600 million destroys near-term returns, and relocation requires NBA board approval, hundreds of millions in fees, and abandoning the market he just bought into.
The appreciation right costs nothing while he operates. It only triggers on a future sale — and the renovation will increase his franchise value by far more than the 8% participation right reduces his proceeds. This deal is not punitive. It is the minimum a rational investor would demand for financing 100% of a $600 million renovation on a building it already owns.
What the amendments actually did
1
"Plaza" deleted from the Arena Fund
Removes "plaza," expanding what public money can be spent on with no defined boundary.
2
"Sports and entertainment district" created
Creates a new legal zone with boundaries drawn by the Blazers' management company, never entered into the legislative record.
3
District-wide tax capture that grows over time
Every new business in the district diverts employee income taxes from the General Fund to the Arena Fund — the more it develops, the larger the diversion.
4
Blazers given right to sue the public authority
The team can seek injunctive relief against the public authority; the public has no equivalent right against the team.
5
Public downgraded from "operator" to "overseer"
Weakens the public's control over the building it owns.
6
Oregon tax confidentiality overridden
Overrides ORS 314.835, allowing tax data to be used in ways normally prohibited — never discussed in committee.
7
State may not own the building
Section 5(1)(b) creates an escape hatch — the public's ownership of the Moda Center may not be guaranteed.
8
Advisory-only negotiator
The required arena negotiation expert is advisory only — Section 6(2)(b) says nothing in the provision requires any particular term in the final agreement.
The amendment that was never voted on
Sen. Pham introduced the -5 amendment, which would have required private capital from the ownership group and revenue sharing with the General Fund — the two provisions that would actually cost the Blazers money. The chair acknowledged the amendment. It was never debated. It was never voted on. The only amendment that required the billionaire to contribute was silently set aside.
The -3 amendment doesn't just fund an arena renovation. It creates a mechanism where public money generates private development, and the taxes from that private development are captured to service the public debt that made it possible. And the diversion from the General Fund grows over time.
Public pays $531-$623 million in state bond costs alone — over a billion when city and county commitments are included to renovate the arena through redirected income taxes.
Renovation makes surrounding Rose Quarter land valuable — creating a "sports and entertainment district" anchored by a modern arena.
Owner develops the land privately — hotels, restaurants, venues, retail — exactly as Dundon is doing in Raleigh with $800M in private development.
Every new business in the district becomes an "operating organization" under Section 4(1)(a). All employee wage withholdings are redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund. The more the district develops, the more income tax gets pulled out of schools, healthcare, and public safety.
Arena Fund services the public debt that made the development possible — using tax revenue that would otherwise fund public services.
The capture continues until the later of lease expiration or all bonds retired (Section 4(3)). The owner keeps every dollar of profit from the private development. The public gets none of it — and loses an ever-growing share of General Fund revenue for the life of the deal.
"The Wagner amendments added a lease and relocation penalties. Isn't that what you asked for?"
It's a start, and it happened because of public pressure. But look at what the amendments actually say. The 20-year lease isn't a concession — Milwaukee got 30, Oklahoma City got 25. This is the floor, not the ceiling. The relocation penalty in Section 6(4)(b) only covers outstanding bond debt. Once the bonds are paid, the penalty disappears. And Section 6(5) actually gives the Blazers the right to seek injunctive relief against the joint authority — meaning the team can sue the public for exercising its own leverage. Most importantly: the amendments only addressed things that cost the ownership group nothing. Zero private capital. Zero revenue sharing. The Arena Fund still locks every public dollar into arena expenses. The reporting requirement still expires in 2032. The legislature addressed our easiest asks and left out everything that involves money.
"Are you trying to kill the deal? Do you want the Blazers to leave?"
No. We support keeping the Trail Blazers in Portland and we support renovating the Moda Center. Every amendment we've proposed is designed to make the deal stronger, not block it. We want SB 1501 to pass with taxpayer protections included. The question is not whether to invest. The question is whether to invest wisely.
"If we push too hard, Dundon will just move the team."
Relocating an NBA franchise requires approval from 16 of 30 team governors, a relocation fee likely in the hundreds of millions, and financing or building a new arena in the destination city at a cost of $1.5 to $2 billion or more. The last attempted NBA relocation, the Sacramento Kings to Seattle, was rejected 22-8 by the Board of Governors. The league is also pursuing expansion to Seattle and Las Vegas, which absorbs the most attractive relocation markets and means there would be even less governor appetite to approve a move. Dundon paid $4.25 billion to be in the Portland market. Asking for basic protections on a $600 million public investment is not going to cause him to abandon that and start over somewhere else. In fact, the Wagner amendments prove this. The ownership group just agreed to a 20-year lease and relocation penalties. You don't accept those terms if you're planning to leave.
"Other cities would happily give $600 million with no strings attached. Portland has no leverage."
Portland owns the Moda Center. The city purchased it for $1 in 2024. That ownership is the leverage. Every lease term, every naming right, every revenue stream flows from the fact that this is a public building. Dundon needs a renovated arena to protect the value of his $4.25 billion purchase, and Portland is offering to provide one. He would need to spend far more to build from scratch elsewhere. Portland is not a supplicant in this negotiation. It is a landlord discussing the terms under which a tenant uses its building.
"The bill says details will be worked out later. Why not wait?"
Because SB 1501 is the enabling legislation. Once it passes, the political momentum to close the deal will make it nearly impossible to negotiate meaningful protections after the fact. Sen. Bruce Starr raised this exact concern during the February 11 hearing, asking that guarantees be written into SB 1501 itself rather than deferred to subsequent legislation. The framework for taxpayer protections belongs in the bill that authorizes the investment, not in a follow-up bill passed under pressure to finalize a deal.
"This deal generates $670 million in annual economic impact. Why are you against that?"
We're not against the Blazers' economic presence. But that $670 million figure represents gross economic activity, not net impact. It does not account for substitution (money spent at Blazers games that would otherwise be spent at other Portland businesses) or for leakage to out-of-state players, the NBA league office, and visiting teams. Decades of peer-reviewed research from Brookings, Stanford, and the National Bureau of Economic Research consistently find that stadium subsidies do not generate net new economic activity at the metro level. Even if you accept the $670 million figure at face value, that is an argument for keeping the team, which we support. It is not an argument for handing over $600 million with no protections.
"No other city has done franchise appreciation rights. Why should Portland be first?"
Because the absence of appreciation protections is exactly why public stadium subsidies consistently enrich private owners at taxpayer expense. The St. Louis Federal Reserve has documented how public investment in Camden Yards inflated the Baltimore Orioles' franchise value. The owner sold the team for a 150% return with nothing flowing back to the Maryland taxpayers who financed the stadium. This pattern has repeated in city after city for decades. Oregon has an opportunity to set a better standard. Being first is not a risk. It is a correction.
"Won't these amendments scare Dundon away?"
Revenue participation, naming rights sharing, PILOTs, and relocation penalties are all standard provisions in public-private arena deals across the country. New York, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, and San Antonio all have one or more of these mechanisms in their arena agreements. The appreciation right is the most novel provision, but it is structured as a simple contractual clause triggered only on a future sale. No more complex than an earn-out in any business acquisition. Zero ongoing operational burden on the franchise. Dundon needs this renovation to protect the value of his $4.25 billion asset. He is not going to walk away from $600 million in public financing because the public asks for basic protections in return.
"Portland already gets economic activity from the arena. Isn't that the return?"
That activity exists because the Blazers play in Portland, not because of the renovation subsidy. Those jobs and that spending would exist regardless of whether taxpayers fund the renovation or the ownership group does. The question is specifically about what the public gets in return for its $600 million contribution. Right now the answer is nothing. No revenue share, no appreciation rights, no property tax equivalency, no relocation protection. The public is being asked to fund a renovation that will directly increase the franchise's revenue and resale value, with zero financial return. That is a gift, not an investment.
"Why should the Moda Center pay property tax equivalency? It's publicly owned."
That is precisely the point. When the arena transferred to city ownership, Portland lost an estimated $1.2 million in annual property tax revenue. Every other commercial property in the Rose Quarter pays property taxes that fund schools, fire departments, and infrastructure. Payments in lieu of taxes, known as PILOTs, are the standard solution for this exact situation. In New York, Yankee Stadium pays approximately $84 million per year in PILOTs, Citi Field approximately $44 million, and Barclays Center approximately $39 million, according to the New York City Independent Budget Office. In Philadelphia, all major sports venues make PILOT payments under state law. This is not a radical proposal. It is the national norm.
"Why does revenue need to go to the General Fund instead of the Arena Fund?"
The Oregon Arena Fund, as defined in Section 2(1) of SB 1501, is continuously appropriated for arena expenses only. Construction, renovation, operations, and debt service. Any money deposited into that fund can only be used to subsidize the Moda Center. A revenue participation payment that recirculates back into arena costs is not a return on investment. It is a subsidy that funds itself. For taxpayers to actually benefit, the money must flow to the General Fund, where it can pay for schools, healthcare, public safety, and the other priorities being cut during Oregon's $650 million budget shortfall.
"The Spurs, Warriors, and 76ers examples aren't comparable to Portland."
They don't need to be identical to be instructive. The Golden State Warriors privately funded the entire $1.4 billion Chase Center. In San Antonio, the Spurs committed over $500 million in private funding alongside public contributions. The point is that private capital contributions from ownership groups are not unprecedented. They are increasingly common. Requiring a contribution from a $4.25 billion ownership group is not unreasonable. We are not demanding full private financing. We are asking that the primary financial beneficiary of the renovation share in its cost.
"I support the Blazers and I support these protections. What can I do?"
Use the form above to email all 60 Oregon state representatives directly. You can also submit official written testimony through the OLIS legislative portal. Every message makes it harder for lawmakers to pass SB 1501 without taxpayer protections. If you want to go further, share this page with anyone who cares about how their tax dollars are spent.
"What is the Raleigh precedent?"
Every comparable NBA arena deal in the last decade required private capital or was built entirely with private money. Portland is the only one that requires zero from the ownership group — dead last out of sixteen deals. This isn't even new for Dundon. In 2023 he signed an arena deal in Raleigh for the Hurricanes — same structure: $300M public for the arena, $0 private, $800M in private development on state-owned land around it. In Raleigh, the Centennial Authority hired Dan Barrett of CAA Icon to negotiate on the public's behalf. Barrett secured $4.5M/year rent, ground lease payments at 6% FMV, PILOTs, 10% affordable housing, and $10M in team-funded improvements. He knows exactly what a fair public deal looks like — because he built one. Now he represents the Blazers in Portland, and the public has no equivalent professional negotiator. Zero rent. Zero revenue sharing. Zero affordable housing. Zero private capital. See the full NBA comparison →
"Why does the -3 amendment create a 'sports and entertainment district'?"
The original bill contained no district concept. The -3 amendment creates a formal legal zone called a "sports and entertainment district" with boundaries defined by a map (Exhibit 2.5) drawn by the Blazers' own management company. This district is not just symbolic — it determines where the income tax capture applies. Under Section 4(1)(a), wage withholdings from every employer in the district are redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund. Today, that captures mostly arena operations — a limited stream. But as commercial development fills the district, every new hotel, restaurant, office, or venue becomes an "operating organization" whose employee taxes get diverted. The district creates the legal infrastructure for development while the tax capture ensures the economic activity from that development services the arena debt rather than funding public services. The boundaries were never entered into the legislative record or publicly debated.
"Why does the tax diversion from the General Fund keep growing?"
Under Section 4(1)(a) of the -3 amendment, wage withholdings from every "operating organization" in the district — defined as any employer deriving revenue from activities physically located in the Rose Quarter — are redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund. Right now that's mostly arena operations, a limited revenue stream. But the capture is designed to scale. If commercial development happens in the district — hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues, offices — every new business that opens becomes an operating organization whose employee withholdings get diverted. The more the district develops, the more income tax gets pulled out of schools, healthcare, and public safety. The capture continues until the later of lease expiration or all bonds are retired (Section 4(3)). Taxpayers fund a $600 million renovation that makes surrounding land valuable, and then the economic activity generated by that development services the debt — instead of going to the General Fund.
"What happened to Sen. Pham's amendment?"
Sen. Pham introduced the -5 amendment to SB 1501, which would have required private capital from the ownership group and revenue sharing with the General Fund — the two provisions that would actually cost Tom Dundon money. During the February 26 Senate Rules Committee hearing, the chair acknowledged the amendment existed. It was never debated. It was never voted on. The -3 amendment, which contains the 8 undisclosed changes, was adopted 5-0. The bill then passed committee 4-1. The only amendment that required the billionaire to contribute was silently set aside. Representative Nathanson also had a -6 amendment drafted to fix the tax diversion timing and tighten the capture scope. Like Pham's -5, it was never posted for committee review.
"What is the total cost to taxpayers?"
The state intends to issue $365 million in bonds, but the total debt service over 20 years is estimated at $531-$623 million depending on the debt instrument, according to the Legislative Fiscal Office. Add the City of Portland's $400 million commitment and Multnomah County's $88 million, and the total public cost exceeds $1 billion. None of this includes opportunity costs from redirecting $38 million per year from the General Fund.
"Does the independent negotiator have binding authority?"
No. The -A13 amendment requires the state to hire a professional with arena negotiation expertise to review comparable NBA deals in similar-sized markets. But Section 6(2)(b) explicitly states that the negotiator's review does not require the inclusion or exclusion of any particular term in the final agreement. The negotiator advises. DAS decides.
"What is Exhibit 2.5?"
Exhibit 2.5 is the map referenced in the -3 amendment that defines the boundaries of the "sports and entertainment district." The district boundaries determine where the income tax capture applies — every employer within the lines on this map has their employee wage withholdings redirected from the General Fund to the Arena Fund, and that diversion grows as new businesses open. The map was drawn by the Blazers' management company. It was never entered into the legislative record. It was never publicly displayed or debated in committee. Legislators voted on an amendment that creates a tax district whose boundaries are defined by a document most of them have likely never seen, drawn by the private entity that benefits from the district's creation.
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